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ABSTRACT
Kalinoski, Zachary T. Ph.D., Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Program, Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2012. Recognizing the Implicit
and Explicit Aspects of Ethical Decision-Making: Schemas, Work Climates, and
Counterproductive Work Behaviors.

There were four purposes for this study. One purpose was to develop a direct assessment of
individuals’ ethical schemas for how to operate within work settings. I proposed structural
assessment using Pathfinder as a means of measuring the structural network of ethical
knowledge. I expected structural assessment to be a better means of assessing moral
development within organizations than the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979). A second purpose
was to examine the extent to which implicit aspects of the ethical decision-making process have
differential effects on behavioral criteria than explicit aspects of ethical decision-making. A
third purpose of this study was to examine the impact that contextual factors (i.e., ethical work
climates) have on ethical decision-making and behavior. Thus, I investigated the unique and
interactive effects of ethical work climates and ethical decision-making on behavioral criteria.
Finally, a fourth purpose of this study was to merge the ethical behavior and counterproductive
work behavior (CWB) literatures to increase our understanding about theory and variables in
both literatures. There were two data collections. In the first sample, I used college
undergraduates to develop measures. In the second sample, I conducted formal tests of
hypotheses. I recruited individuals who participated in Amazon’s MechanicalTurk program,
which reflected a diverse set of individuals with a wealth of work experience. In addition, I used
full-time employees who were enrolled in an MBA program to increase sample size. I used
hierarchical regression to test hypotheses. Results showed that using structural assessment and
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Pathfinder to measure ethical schemas accounted for unique variance in CWBs, controlling for
the DIT, and that implicit processes exhibited a greater impact on CWBs than explicit processes.
The implications for theory development, training, selection and organizational cultures are
discussed.
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Introduction
“Business ethics is an oxymoron.” This phrase reflects a commonly held assumption
within the public sphere, especially given the scandals that have driven national economies into
recessions. Needless to say, scholars have argued that business ethics is not an oxymoron on the
grounds that cooperation among constituents actually breeds more competitive organizations
(Cragg, 1997). In other words, unethical organizations yield poor public reputations, less return
business, increased costs, increased turnover of “good employees” due to P-O misfit, and risk
long-term viability in return for short-term gains (Cialdini, 1996; Cialdini, Petrova & Goldstein,
2004). If organizations viewed ethics from their stakeholders’ perspective (e.g., suppliers,
customers, employees), they would likely arrive at ethically-derived decisions and increase their
credibility within the public realm (Kaptein, 2008; Weber, 2007). Unfortunately, the study of
business ethics has not quite kept pace with advances in the scientific field. Thus, the
overarching purpose of this study was to integrate the study of business ethics with advances in
the conceptualization and measurement of these constructs and with research in a related area,
counterproductive work behavior. The purpose of this study was four-fold.
First, I sought to investigate alternative measures of individual cognitive moral
development by using a technique called structural assessment. Much research to date has relied
on the Defining Issues Test (i.e., DIT; Rest, 1979) to measure explicit, cognitive moral
development. The DIT is generic (i.e., wide-ranging content) and reflects post-decision
rationalization. Using structural assessment will allow researchers to assess the pre-decision,
context-specific structure of ethical business knowledge as opposed to a post-decision, generic
measure of moral development. Second, the DIT relies upon Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of
moral development. The Kohlberg framework assumes that most ethical decisions are conscious
1

and rationally-determined, which may be an incorrect assumption given recent evidence
regarding intuitive decision-making. I intended to examine the differential effects of explicit and
implicit moral reasoning on work-related outcomes. A third purpose of this study was to
integrate the business ethics and counterproductive work behaviors (i.e., CWBs) literature.
Business ethics research and workplace deviance research have developed relatively
independently, and there are potential benefits of integrating the two literatures by investigating
the different antecedents and outcomes traditionally examined in both domains (Kish-Gephart,
Harrison & Treviño, 2010). Finally, the fourth purpose of this study was to observe the main and
interactive effects of ethical work climates and individual moral reasoning on CWBs.
Examining individual-level variables only is not adequate for describing ethical behaviors, given
that these situations are socially-dependent. Therefore, I expect to find contextual variables to be
influential.
Before I begin to discuss measures of the ethical reasoning construct, it is necessary to
introduce the construct of CWBs both in relation to organizational citizenship behaviors and
ethical behavior. This will lay the groundwork for discussing the differential effects of explicit
and implicit moral reasoning and ethical work climates on CWBs.
Counterproductive Work Behaviors (CWBs)
The job performance domain is more complex and multidimensional than originally
proposed (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). Furthermore,
some have advocated that job performance is comprised of two main components: task and
contextual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994). Raters
of job performance often equally weight task and contextual performance (Borman &
Motowidlo, 1997; Johnson, 2001). Task performance relates to aspects that are particular to a
2

job that maintain the production of goods and services. These aspects tend to be formally stated
as the core components of a job. Contextual performance, on the other hand, relates to aspects of
the job that are not formally defined but that maintain the social, psychological and
organizational environment in which these goods and services are produced (Motowidlo,
Borman, & Schmit, 1997).
The two main forms of contextual performance are organizational citizenship behaviors
and CWBs. Organ (1988) defined organizational citizenship behaviors as “individual behavior
that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that
in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (p. 4). Coleman and
Borman (2000) suggested that there are three factors of organizational citizenship behaviors:
interpersonal support (i.e., informal mentoring, helping others, high team morale), organizational
support (i.e., following company policies, speaking well of the company, organizational
commitment), and conscientious initiative (i.e., extreme effort, independent skill growth).
CWBs, on the other hand, refer to intentional behavior that is harmful to the interests of the
organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Dalal, 2005; Gruys & Sackett, 2003; Robinson &
Bennett, 1995). Examples of CWBs include sabotage, on-the-job drug/alcohol abuse, theft,
absenteeism, safety violations, property destruction/vandalism, verbal/physical abuse. Recent
researchers have debated the purported relationship between organizational citizenship behaviors
and CWBs and found that the two may not be as negatively related as previously thought (Dalal,
2005; Spector, Bauer & Fox, 2010). These researchers discovered differences in the
organizational citizenship behavior-CWB relationship, depending on the scale format (i.e.,
agreement vs. frequency), measurement source (i.e., supervisor vs. self), and content overlap
(i.e., overlap between organizational citizenship behavior and CWB content vs. no overlap in
3

content). Therefore, these researchers have concluded that the relationship may be negligible as
opposed to negative.
Robinson and Bennett (1995) proposed two important components of CWBs. One
component corresponds to the target of the CWB (i.e., organizational vs. interpersonal). For
instance, Robinson and Bennett (1995) proposed that negative behaviors aimed at organizations
are likely to be different than those aimed at others within the workplace. These behaviors were
hypothesized to represent two distinct clusters of behaviors. The other component refers to the
severity of the act (i.e., minor vs. serious). Here, Robinson and Bennett (1995) proposed that
both organization and interpersonal CWBs are comprised of behaviors that are both minor and
serious. A minor, organizational behavior would be production deviance (e.g., leaving early,
wasting resources). A serious, organizational behavior is property deviance (e.g., accepting
kickbacks, stealing from company). On the other hand, a minor, interpersonal deviant behavior
is political deviance (e.g., spreading gossip, showing favoritism). Finally, a serious,
interpersonal behavior is personal aggression (e.g., sexual harassment, stealing from coworkers).
Thus, Robinson and Bennett (2000) proposed four types of CWBs. Bennett and
Robinson (2000) described these distinctions in terms of qualitative and quantitative differences.
For instance, they distinguished between qualitative differences in content of CWBs based on the
target as well as quantitative differences based on the severity of the CWB. These distinctions
would be akin to giving a math and a spelling achievement test and assessing the item difficulty
per exam. There are two targets (i.e., interpersonal and organizational) and each one varies
along the severity distinction (i.e., minor to serious) much like achievement tests can reflect
different content domains (i.e., math and spelling) and each have varying levels of item difficulty
4

(i.e., easy to hard). Thus, to the extent that organizational and interpersonal CWBs reflect
qualitative differences, there will be minor and serious forms, reflecting quantitative differences,
of CWBs within each qualitative category. Given the above explanation and given that the
severity distinction exists within both organizational and interpersonal CWBs, Bennett and
Robinson (2000) created a self-report measure with two factors: organizational and
interpersonal.
Gruys and Sackett (2003) developed another self-report measure and conducted three
types of analyses: sorting task, confirmatory factor analysis (i.e., item level), and
multidimensional scaling analysis (i.e., category level). First, Gruys and Sackett (2003) sorted
250 examples of deviant behaviors derived from the literature into 11 categories to assess a
wider range of CWBs than previous measures allowed (i.e., Bennett & Robinson, 2000). The
final tally was 66 items sorted into the original 11 categories. Second, confirmatory factor
analyses of all items suggested a fit for all 11 dimensions as well as a general factor (i.e., general
counterproductive work behavior) underlying these 11 CWB dimensions. Finally, Gruys and
Sackett (2003) subjected the categories to co-occurrence ratings and used multidimensional
scaling techniques to detect the extent to which some categories were likely to co-occur. This
scaling technique resulted in two dimensions. One dimension resembled the interpersonalorganizational distinction defined by Robinson and Bennett (1995). The other dimension
resembled task relevance. Gruys and Sackett (2003) conducted this analysis at the category
level; thus, the categories varied on this task relevance dimension such that individuals who
commit theft also would be more likely to misuse company information but less likely to violate
safety concerns at work. Similarly, individuals who are persistently tardy are also more likely to
misuse company time while less likely to physically or verbally abuse a co-worker. Nonetheless,
5

Gruys and Sackett (2003) suggested that given certain groups of behaviors tend to co-occur, they
are likely to have similar antecedents.
Regardless, the most widely replicated distinction of CWBs is the two target dimensions
(i.e., Interpersonal vs. Organizational; Dalal, 2005; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Whereas these
two dimensions are highly correlated (r = .62-.70; Dalal, 2005; Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007),
they nonetheless have differential antecedents (Berry et al., 2007; Bowling & Gruys, 2010).
Thus, this distinction will have pertinent and important implications for the study of explicit and
implicit moral reasoning (discussed later).
CWBs and unethical behavior reflect distinct constructs but retain some conceptual
overlap (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). That is, CWBs suggest a violation of organizational norms
whereas unethical behavior implies a violation of societal norms. However, these pairings may
not always be completely distinct. For instance, lying to customers may not violate an
organizational norm, but it would violate accepted societal norms. In other words, lying to
customers may be deemed acceptable and indeed be rewarded in certain organizations, but
society would deem this behavior to be unethical. On the other hand, gossiping is generally
tolerated in society but may violate particular organizational norms. One benefit of investigating
CWBs rather than unethical behaviors in general is that CWBs have been conceptualized and
defined more clearly than unethical behaviors.
To date, three measures have been developed and used to assess unethical behavior.
Newstrom and Ruch (1975) developed the first measure, which focused on measuring intraorganizational, managerial ethical violations. Kaptein (2008) criticized this measure on the basis
that it lacked breadth, procedural transparency in item selection, and psychometric evaluations.
In response, Kaptein (2008) attempted to categorize ethical behaviors according to a stakeholder
6

perspective (e.g., customers, suppliers, employees, society, and financiers). This perspective
demonstrated that the same behaviors could be applied to each stakeholder. A stakeholder
perspective is important because it allows individuals to assess ethical breaches within and
between organizations. In addition, Mumford et al. (2006; 2008) created a context-specific
measure of ethical decision-making that used dimensions relevant to scientific ethics (i.e., data,
study conduct, professional and business practices).
Whereas these models are beneficial for their particular circumstances (i.e., management,
stakeholders, and science), it remains difficult to determine the relative influences of ethical
cognitive antecedents. Whereas I applaud the researchers’ efforts for recognizing the need to
develop job-specific measures of ethical behaviors, they do not offer a framework for studying
different effects of moral, cognitive antecedents on ethical behaviors. This is not necessarily a
criticism of the measures; rather, it is difficult to apply these frameworks to the question of
interest. In addition, a sub-goal of investigating moral, cognitive antecedents on CWBs is to
integrate the CWB-ethical behavior literature.
Now that I have described the criterion of interest, I will turn to describing the
background of cognitive moral development--its history, its assumptions, and how I propose
moral reasoning should be measured (as opposed to how it is currently measured).
The Theory of Moral Development and Measuring Moral Reasoning
Kohlberg (1958) proposed a stage-like framework for understanding individuals’ moral
development course according to a justice and rights perspective. Kohlberg (1958) described
three stages: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. Pre-conventional moral
schemas are characterized by a person’s inability to think of others and the consequences of
his/her actions on others when enacting his/her decisions. This level has been characterized as
7

“the criminal” level of morality. Individuals seek to avoid punishment and adhere to the hedonic
principle. An individual who has a conventional schema, on the other hand, abides by the
“golden rule” and the “letter of the law.” “The Golden Rule” and abiding by rules and
regulations are the norm for people operating at this level of morality. These types of individuals
are able to perceive higher authorities as the ruling force and believe that these rules are just and
purposive. The post-conventional level of morality reflects issues related to the “spirit of the
law” and “ethical principles.” Thus, a law can be broken if it serves the betterment of society in
general. In extreme cases, this stage can even lead to self-sacrifice for the greater good of others.
This level is said to be the apex of moral maturity.
Indeed, the DIT has been the most commonly used metric for determining the level of an
individual’s moral reasoning (Rest, 1979). The DIT is designed to assess a person’s moral
schema (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). The process of the DIT is first to activate an individual’s
moral schema. The activated schemas then drive ethical choices to resolve ethical dilemmas.
Next, the DIT requires participants to engage in conscious reasoning to justify ethical choices,
post-decision. Specifically, the DIT has five life vignettes that present test-takers with ethical
dilemmas, and test-takers must respond in three different ways. One, they must decide the
proper course of action (e.g., steal, don’t steal, can’t decide). Two, after the decision has been
made, test-takers rate twelve issues related to the vignette on a 5-point scale. Finally, the four
most important issues that test-takers considered when making their decision are rank-ordered
from most to least important. For example, the first vignette deals with famine and whether a
father should steal from a rich man to feed his family. An example of an issue related to
decisions regarding famine is “Shouldn’t the community laws be upheld?” Test-takers would
rate the importance of this item in their decision. Finally, test-takers would rank the top four
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issues in their decisions. These responses are used to compute various scores that reflect a
person’s moral schema.
The most commonly used DIT metric is the P-score (Mudrack, 2003). The “P” in Pscore refers to “principled.” Thus, it captures the number of issues that test-takers rank as
important for influencing decisions that belong to the principled category of moral reasoning.
Test-takers rank-order the four most important issues that influenced their vignette decision. The
DIT then is calculated by weighting these issues. The most important issue for determining
decisions is weighted by 4, the second-most important issue by 3, third most important by 2, and
the fourth most important issue by 1. However, in order to be given a non-zero weight, these
issues must belong to the principled category (i.e., post-conventional thinking). If an issue falls
within a lower level category (i.e., pre-conventional or conventional), the issue is weighted with
a 0. The sum of these products is then divided by number of vignettes to compute the final Pscore. The main problem with the P-score is two-fold: (1) it equates pre-conventional and
conventional individuals (when they are, in fact, very different) and (2) it suffers from low
power. Regarding the first problem, Mudrack (2003) suggested that conventional thinkers can
make the same decision as post-conventional thinkers, but conventional thinkers can have a score
of zero on the P index compared to post-conventional thinkers. Also, pre-conventional thinkers
can make a different decision compared to the higher level thinkers but still have the same Pscore as the conventional thinkers (i.e., all issues are weighted by zero). The other problem deals
with low power. Mudrack (2003) claimed that very few individuals reach the stage of postconventional reasoning. In fact, in his sample, Greenberg (2002) discovered that less than 1% of
individuals operated at the post-conventional level. Thus, if researchers rely on the P-score, they
are restricting the amount of variance that exists to make predictions.
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Alternatives to the P-scores are the D and U scores. These metrics are used less because
of the costs associated with the complicated calculations needed to compute them (Mudrack,
2003). Nevertheless, they offer a more meaningful understanding of an individual’s level of
moral reasoning. For instance, the D score uses the issue ratings and all levels of moral
reasoning, not just the post-conventional level. High D scorers would rate issues at a more
advanced level than intermediaries, which in turn would be more advanced than preconventional thinkers. This metric distinguishes individuals even if they have made the same
decision. U scores, on the other hand, are a measure of the consistency between reasoning and
action. Thus, if a respondent chooses an unethical option in response to a vignette but their
reasoning was more post-conventional, they would have a low U score. Similarly, ethical
actions coupled with post-conventional reasoning would yield a high U score.
Even though the D and U scores offer improvement above the P score, they are still
susceptible to the same assumptions of the DIT that render the DIT suspect when attempting to
measure moral reasoning. There are five assumptions of the DIT that warrant apprehension.
One, Narvaez and Bock (2002) admitted that most of the changes in moral schemata are
particularly visible “throughout adolescence and early adulthood” (304). This claim implies that
no change and/or improvement can be expected for adult working populations above this age
group. If true, this would render the DIT, and ethics training in general, meaningless and
ineffective for older, adult employees.
A second assumption is that individuals cannot regress to previous stages of moral
development. Kohlberg and Lickona (1976) suggested that some people do regress, even though
they cannot skip stages progressively. Kohlberg and Lickona (1976) rectified this caveat by
extending the theory of moral development to include half-stages, where individuals can partially
10

move on to the next stage while simultaneously understanding the previous stage. This is similar
to Abraham Maslow’s (1943) reasoning for including flexibility in his hierarchy of needs theory.
However, Fraedrich and Ferrell (1992) discovered that people do change their reasoning
perspective depending on the context. They found that only 15% of respondents retained the
same moral philosophy type when responding to work and non-work vignettes. This is relevant
in terms of applying the DIT to business contexts. For example, the same person may apply
different moral perspectives to resolving business ethics dilemmas than when attempting to
resolve personal, heath-related dilemmas.
A third assumption relates to the prevalent use of student samples for business ethics
training. Ethics training is a defining component of the business education curriculum. Most of
these students fall within the early adulthood age range. Many ethics training studies use
business students as their sample (Allen, Bacdayan, Kowalski, & Roy, 2005; Borkowski &
Ugras, 1998; Cleek & Leonard, 1998; Gautschi & Jones, 1998; James & Cohen, 2004; Jones,
2009; Loe & Weeks, 2000; Stanga & Turpen, 1991; Tang & Chen, 2008). Often, these training
interventions are designed to include social interaction amongst students, which Narvaez and
Bock (2002) claimed was essential to individual moral development. Most of these courses are
grounded in business contexts. However, the intellectual and educational level of college
business students may be different than that of the general population. Also, business students,
presumably, do not possess much experience in socially interacting within business contexts
(Tang & Chen, 2008). That is, I would argue that a student’s moral schema would be more
developed and complex if the students’ schema was informed by actual business experiences
than by role-playing exercises. Additionally, the DIT measures general moral reasoning and is
not specific to business contexts. Thus, the DIT might not be sensitive to detecting the level of
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moral reasoning within a certain context such as business, and suiting the measurement to the
context may improve predictive and face validity. Mumford, Devenport, Brown, Connelly,
Murphy, Hill, and Antes (2006) demonstrated the feasibility and usefulness of developing a DITlike measure suited to a particular context (i.e., designed for graduate students in biology and
psychology). Thus, for a variety of reasons, using student samples to examine business ethics
training might be problematic.
A fourth assumption of the DIT is that it there is one moral perspective which all
respondents use to complete the decision-making tasks. Fraedrich, Thorne, and Ferrell (1994)
suggested that the basis of cognitive moral development, as measured by the DIT, is invalid
because it assumes only one valid end state. Indeed, the DIT reflects one ethical perspective,
that of Kohlberg’s rights and justice perspective. However, it is possible, Fraedrich et al. (1994)
argued, to have multiple, equally viable end states. Other perspectives, such as Gilligan’s (1982)
“ethics of caring,” can be a viable ethics perspective that employees may use when making
ethical business decisions. The DIT does not take this perspective into account when assessing
an individual’s ethical awareness and moral schemata. Even some of the DIT proponents have
stated that “there are other moral schemas that a person might use other than the three that the
DIT measures, such as specific religious or cultural moral schemas” (pp. 305; Narvaez & Bock,
2002). Thus, Fraedrich et al. (1994) questioned the claim that tests of cognitive moral
development such as the DIT will transfer to ethical decision-making in business contexts. A
related sub-point is that a general concern remains that the DIT offers limited, pre-defined
choices. For instance, the assumption underlying the famine dilemma within the DIT is that the
only option is to steal from a rich man in order to feed a person’s starving family. In reality,
there may be many choices other than stealing. In addition, most individuals would never face
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the situations that the DIT assesses. Thus, the DIT may be flawed by omission of possible
options.
A final assumption of the DIT is that moral decisions are rectified through logical
reasoning and controlled processing. Critics such as Haidt (2001) suggested that moral reasoning
is little more than post-hoc rationalization and is constructed after decisions have been made.
Kramer and Messick (1996) suggested that decision-makers act as “intuitive lawyers” when
rationalizing decisions. Decision-makers form judgments in self-serving ways to defend actions.
Decision-makers tend to engage in active construction and re-framing (e.g., strategic selfcategorization). Logic and rationality make way for pragmatism and confirmation bias.
However, moral judgment theories have relied on the rationalist model of thought and have not
properly taken into account the social and cultural influences on ethical decisions.
In contrast, the social intuitionist model suggests that moral judgments are made below
conscious reasoning on an automatic, intuitive level. In other words, individuals do not
consciously and rationally evaluate every piece of information when forming decisions. In a
way, the social intuitionist perspective is in line with schema theory, in that individuals rely on
their knowledge structures to quickly process incoming stimuli. Incoming information that is
consistent with existing schemas is incorporated whereas inconsistent information is discarded as
irrelevant or forgotten quickly, unless frequent or persistent stimuli are present. Persistent
stimuli that are incongruent with existing schemas will result in either accommodation or the
formation of a new schema. Otherwise, new, consistent information is assimilated into existing
schemas. Thus, schemas affect the perception and recall of incoming information. The greater
the match between incoming stimuli and schemas, the less likely controlled processing will
operate, even when the situation may call for it. If individuals rely on moral schemas to make
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judgments about individual choices, then the social constructivist model may more accurately
describe the phenomena we are wishing to assess. To the extent that the DIT measures postdecision rationalization of ethical vignette responses, perhaps we need a more sensitive measure
of moral schemas, and one such measure might be structural assessment.
Alternative measurement. Structural assessment measures how individuals organize
knowledge into abstract meanings and constructions (Kraiger, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 1995;
Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997). Knowledge structures explain variance in achievement above and
beyond that of declarative knowledge (Kraiger, et al., 1995). Structural assessment measures are
only marginally related to traditional forms of learning, suggesting that structural assessments
are measuring different components of the learning domain (Kraiger et al., 1995).
Structural assessments are conducted by having experts and novices/intermediates make
similarity judgment ratings of concepts within a domain (Goldsmith & Kraiger, 1997). Example
concept statements might be “Workplace Code of Conduct” and “Compliance with laws and
regulations.” Participants then would be asked to rate how similar these two statements are to
each other. Using multidimensional scaling, cognitive structures are derived from the
comparison ratings to compute two indexes. One index is called a closeness parameter, which
compares the individual with an expert referent and ranges from zero to one. A closeness
parameter is the ratio of common neighbors to total possible neighbors that link each node. A
closeness parameter resembles the absolute value of a correlation coefficient, as one signifies
complete overlap (i.e., the same) and zero represents completely different structures (i.e., no
relation). Multiple referents increase the reliability of ratings (Kraiger et al., 1995). The other
index is called a coherence parameter, which measures the internal consistency of ratings (i.e.,
the stability of the concept judgments). This index is referent-free and internal to the individual.
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There are several benefits of using structural assessments over measures such as the DIT
when measuring cognitive moral schemas. One, structural assessment is content-specific. One
criticism of the DIT and similar measures is their diverse content within the fictional scenarios
(e.g., famine, political demonstrations, sickness, school boards). It is possible that such diverse
content might trigger the use of more diverse moral concepts, i.e., moral concepts unrelated to
the justice and rights concept underpinning the DIT. For instance, respondents may form
decisions relating to the sickness dilemma according to religious or caring perspectives whereas
they may use the justice perspective to resolve the political dilemma. However, when justifying
their decisions, the DIT forces respondents to choose between issues that correspond to the
justice and rights perspective. This forces respondents into a mode of justification, even if they
did not actually use the justice and rights perspective to arrive at their decision. People are likely
swayed by the context and content of the measure which may not accurately predict ethical
behavior in a business context (Marnburg, 2001).
A second benefit is that, unlike the DIT, structural assessment does not rely on postdecision rationalization for individuals to explain their reasoning. Rather, respondents rate
associations between concepts that are related to the domain of interest (i.e., business ethics) but
not dependent upon a scenario that likely has diverse content. This also may be a more adequate
measure of moral schemas than the DIT because the DIT assumes that the reasoning caused the
decision, but the reasoning is measured post-decision and as such might reflect rationalization
rather than the reasoning actually used. More specifically, the DIT assumes that individuals have
conscious access to pre-decision cognitions and are making ethical decisions rationally. Also,
the DIT assumes that respondents can and will accurately recall and document the causes of
decisions. In contrast, the social intuitionist model would predict that, in some situations, ‘gut’
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feelings are created that lead to decision-making when presented with an ethical dilemma, which
then causes the reasoning for the decision (Haidt, 2001). By using structural assessment, we may
be more likely to measure the cognitive organization of moral knowledge. In contrast, the DIT
may reflect to a greater extent effortful justification and post-decision rationalization which may
or may not align with the underlying organization of moral knowledge that leads to ethical
resolutions. In particular, the relationship between the proposed measure (i.e., structural
assessment) and the criteria poses a stronger match than the relationship between the DIT and the
criteria (i.e., CWBs). Also, the DIT may not measure all relevant aspects of the ethical reasoning
process, reflecting potential contamination or deficiency. Likewise, structural assessment may
more adequately capture organized knowledge than the DIT.
Hypothesis 1: Structural assessment of moral reasoning will explain unique variance in
CWBs controlling for the DIT.
The Implicitness of Moral Reasoning: The Differential Prediction of Counterproductive
Work Behaviors
Most business ethics research has relied on the paradigm set forth by Rest (1979). This
paradigm, called cognitive moral development, posits that individuals process ethical
information in a rational, consciously controlled manner. Individuals progress consciously and
rationally from ethical awareness to ethical behavior. Recent evidence would suggest, however,
that this framework may not adequately reflect the true nature of ethical decision-making in
general or in business contexts in particular. At best, it may only tell half of the story. Drawing
on multiple fields to delineate a clear picture of ethical decision-making, researchers have drawn
upon approaches from cognitive neuroscience, physiology, psychology, philosophy, and other
fields (Haidt, 2001; Reynolds, 2006; Sonenshein, 2007). The heart of each of these approaches
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is that ethical decision-making often is not rational; rather, people rely on intuition, “gut
feelings,” whims, or assumptions. Conscious activity still operates in ethical decision-making to
a certain degree but only when an individual is called upon to defend actions or when prototypes
do not match incoming stimuli, resulting in active judgments and controlled processing
(Reynolds, 2006).
An implicit model of ethical decision-making. Reynolds (2006) proposed a
neurocognitive model of ethical decision-making that accounts for the cognitive and intuitive
portions of the decision-making process. This model draws on models of naturalistic and
recognition-primed decision making found in the human factors literature (Klein, 2008;
Patterson, Fournier, Pierce, Winterbottom, & Tripp, 2009). Reynolds (2006) described his
model as consisting of two systems: the X-system and the C-system. The X-system corresponds
to a reflexive pattern-matching system whereas the C-system represents a higher-order conscious
reasoning system. Sunstein (2005) called these systems System I and System II, respectively.
Regardless, Reynolds (2006) described his model as a cerebral search of prototypes and
structuring of information when dealing with incoming ethical stimuli. If a search reveals a
prototype that resembles the current state, reflexive judgments (i.e., the X-system) take place and
behavioral intentions/actions are enacted. However, if a prototype is not found, the anterior
cingulate “sounds an alarm” to the X-system that causes individuals to engage in active
processing (i.e., the C-system). Reynolds (2006) likened the C-system, then, to a manager who
monitors when to micro-manage the X-system and when to allow the X-system to self-regulate.
Active judgments involving known moral rules, environmental influences, and the restructuring
of existing prototypes allow individuals to formulate ethical intentions/behaviors using novel
information. Reflexive judgments also can be subjected to higher order conscious reasoning, i.e.,
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post-decision rationalization. This occurs if individual ethical choices display non-optimal
consequences or if individuals have to defend the reasoning behind their own ethical choices.
This rationalization also can restructure prototypes used to make ethical judgments. Reynolds
(2006) suggested four ways that unethical behavior may occur as a result of the neurocognitive
model: (1) failure to match situation with correct prototype, (2) prototypes that incorrectly
designate the wider opinions on the suitability of actions, (3) ill-conceived or misdirected moral
rules, and (4) incorrect applications of socially accepted morals. Thus, Reynolds’ (2006)
neurocognitive model offers a compelling, realistic means to investigate the effects of ethical
decision-making on ethics-related behaviors. This theoretical framework governs the predictions
that I intend to examine.
Intuitive and conscious influences on ethical behaviors. Kish-Gephart, et al. (2010)
conducted a meta-analysis on the individual, situational and organizational antecedents of ethical
choices (i.e., intentions and behaviors). Surprisingly, they discovered that these antecedents had
stronger effects on behaviors than intentions. One reason they offered for this finding is that
research has not adequately modeled the ethical decision-making process. Intentions arise from
calculated reasoning whereas behavior may stem from conscious reasoning, impulsive responses,
or both. Cognitive moral development (i.e., DIT) predicted unethical intentions (ρ = -.18)
slightly better than unethical behavior (ρ = -.13). This would be expected given the reliance of
cognitive moral development on active judgments and post-decision rationalizations. However,
job satisfaction predicted unethical behaviors (ρ = -.21) much more strongly than it did unethical
intentions (ρ = -.03). Job satisfaction possesses both affective and cognitive components.
However, it tends to be more influenced by its affective components, which may lead to more
intuitive decision-making regarding ethical action.
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As stated before, Sunstein (2005) suggested that System I (i.e., X-system) processing
encompasses an affective component. Ethical behaviors may be operating “under the radar,” so
to speak, or at least mostly outside of the cognitive realm. Thus, satisfied workers may not
intend to act ethically but may do so without much conscious effort. Thiel, Connelly, and
Griffith (in press) suggested that discrete emotions (i.e., anger) tend to evoke heuristic processing
and more negative secondary appraisals of ethical situations. Angry individuals, in turn, arrive at
less ethical decisions and use less meta-cognitive reasoning strategies. Thus, dissatisfied
employees may react (i.e., behaviorally) more negatively to ethical situations even when they do
not intend to do so because their discrete emotions bypass the route of active information
processing.
In related research, Marquardt (2010) investigated the effects of implicit and explicit
attitudes on Rest’s (1986) stages of moral development (i.e., awareness, judgment, intention and
behavior) using managerial samples in a complex, ethical decision-making scenario. She found
that implicit ethical attitudes predicted ethical behavior more strongly than did explicit ethical
attitudes. Surprisingly, she found the same to be true for ethical intentions as well. This finding
may be due to the fact that Marquardt (2010) increased the complexity of the scenario in order to
increase ecological validity. Thus, she may have made the task too complex so as to cause
frustration among participants, which would induce heuristic processing and allow the X-system
to override any conscious surveillance of the ethical situation. On the other hand, if the author
intended for the task to be complex when, in fact, it was not, the individual also would rely on
the X-system because simple situations would call for simpler cognitive operations.
Whereas I would not suggest that affect is synonymous with intuition, the consequences
of both may be similar. For instance, implicit attitudes and intuitive decision-making both result
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from the quick associations that are made between two stimuli (Treviño & Nelson, 2010). For
instance, if taking a race version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a person with a strong
preference for Whites will respond more quickly to associations of the words “black” and “bad”
than if the pairings were “black” and “good.”
Researchers have suggested that the IAT is a useful tool for investigating the implicitness
of our ethical belief systems (Reynolds, 2006; Treviño & Nelson, 2010). Further, some have
adapted the IAT to assess ethicality and moral self-concepts (Marquardt, 2010; Perugini &
Leone, 2009; Reynolds, Leavitt, & Decelles, 2010). Reynolds et al. (2010) were interested in the
implicit beliefs that “business is ethical.” They found that the more individuals believed that
regular business practices (e.g., competition, shareholder obligations, financial performance)
were ethical, the more inclined individuals were to behave immorally on an in-basket exercise.
Reynolds et al. (2010) suggested that this belief (i.e., “business is ethical”) stems from the
perceived legitimacy of business practices and evokes a capitalistic, economic-minded
perspective. Someone who believed that business was unethical would be less inclined to
behave unethically and more inclined to adopt a collaborative, other-oriented view of business.
Thus, if an individual believes that business is ethical, then any business-related task would be
construed as ethical as well, even if the act itself was not ethical (e.g., in the Reynolds et al. task,
falsifying an insurance claim).
Integrating the ethical behavior and workplace deviance literatures.
Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) found that researchers within the ethical behavior and
workplace deviance fields have failed to investigate similar antecedents. For instance,
researchers have studied narrow cognitive variables (i.e., cognitive moral development)
abundantly in the ethical behavior literature but very little in the workplace deviance literature
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(Berry et al., 2007; Lee & Allen, 2002). On the other hand, researchers have examined the role
of affect and personality in the workplace deviance literature but rarely in the ethical behavior
literature (Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010).
Lee and Allen (2002) examined the effects of job cognitions and job affect on
organizational citizenship behaviors and CWBs. They suggested that job affect would predict
organizational citizenship behaviors and CWBs directed towards individuals better than job
cognitions. They expected job cognitions to predict organizational citizenship behaviors and
CWBs directed towards the organization more strongly than job affect. They expected these
findings because behaviors directed towards the organization tend to be more cognitive. Upon
organizational entry, employees agree to a psychological contract with their employer. This
contract is based on valued expectations between both parties. In other words, the employee will
perform the tasks of the job and the employer will reciprocate with pay and benefits. Thus, if the
expectations are met by both parties, employees will be more likely to engage in organizational
citizenship behaviors. On the other hand, individuals acting out against another employee may
be more emotionally-charged and not necessarily the result of circumstances associated with
their job (e.g., psychological contract violation). Indeed, they found this to be true for
organizational citizenship behaviors. However, they were unable to replicate this finding for
CWBs because the factor analysis of the CWB measure revealed one factor. Thus, there was no
distinction in their sample between CWBs directed toward the organization or others.
Regardless, they found that job cognitions more strongly predicted CWBs than job affect.
Given that Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) suggested that there is a need to connect the
workplace deviance and ethical behavior literatures, I have elected to investigate the effects of
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ethical antecedents on CWBs. Another major suggestion from Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) is to
examine whether implicit and explicit moral antecedents predict behaviors differently.
Prior research has shown that trait anger, negative affectivity, and job affect are stronger
predictors of interpersonally-based CWBs whereas job cognitions and conscientiousness are
stronger predictors of organizationally-based CWBs (Dalal, 2005; Lee & Allen, 2002; O’Brien &
Allen, 2008). It would appear that CWBs directed toward other individuals are likely to be
emotional, which are more prone to reflexive judgments. In contrast, individuals who direct
CWBs towards the organization tend to be driven more by attempts to reduce perceived
inequities or lack of conscientious thinking. I integrated this research with implicit and explicit
moral reasoning.
Using the logic of Lee and Allen (2002), it could be that implicit and explicit moral
reasoning would differentially predict CWBs according to its target dimension. That is, implicit
moral reasoning would have a greater probability of predicting interpersonal CWBs whereas
explicit moral reasoning would have a greater probability of predicting organizational CWBs.
Indeed, Lee and Allen (2002) found that job cognitions (i.e., an individual’s expectations and
values from a job and whether those expectations are or have been met) was a stronger predictor
than job affect (i.e., an individual’s feelings toward his/her job) of how well individuals treated
the organization. These decisions are likely made on the basis of some conscious reasoning
process that determines whether individuals will speak well of their employer in public or misuse
proprietary information that would damage company reputation (depending on whether these
expectations are met). This is likely influenced by instrumental motivation (i.e., underpayment
inequity), which attempts to “right” a perceived “wrong.” Job affect, on the other hand,
predicted how well individuals treated co-workers, more so than job cognitions. Lee and Allen
22

(2002) expected this because of individuals’ expressive motivation, which is characterized by the
propensity to express anger, outrage, or frustration. These outlets are less about restoring order
to the organization and more about articulating affect. Given that System I operations involve
affective components (Sunstein, 2005), it is likely that intuitive moral processing will be more
strongly related to interpersonally-related behaviors than cognitive moral processing. Thus, to
the extent that my measure of implicit reasoning captures reflexive functioning, I expect that
implicit moral reasoning would predict interpersonal CWBs more strongly than organizational
CWBs. Moreover, I expect that the explicit measures of moral reasoning would predict
organizational CWBs more strongly than interpersonal CWBs.
Hypothesis 2: Implicit moral reasoning will explain incremental variance in
interpersonally-based CWBs, controlling for explicit moral reasoning.
Hypothesis 3: Explicit moral reasoning will explain incremental variance in
organizationally-based CWBs, controlling for implicit moral reasoning.
The practical implications of delineating the differential antecedents of deviant behaviors
are two-fold. One, understanding the cognitive antecedents of particular behaviors can help
shape the design, delivery and evaluation of ethics training and education seminars. For
instance, if a needs assessment conducted within a particular organization reveals specific
problem areas (e.g., misuse of company information), then instructional designers can appeal to
the rational, conscious side of moral reasoning. If, on the other hand, problems persist regarding
safety precautions, then more intuitive-based training (such as game-based training) may be
employed to improve decision-making in this area. Two, understanding the different influences
of deviant behaviors can influence cultural/climate change initiatives. Fostering the most
optimal climates will depend on the problems of the particular organization and which sets of
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behaviors are more frequent or more severe. Enacting the proper change mechanisms and
introducing new policies would depend on the types of behaviors that are problematic.
Up to this point, I have proposed to investigate CWBs with individual, cognitive-based
antecedents. Nonetheless, studying behavior solely at the individual level is imprecise. In
particular, moral and ethical behavior has strong social components that take into account
individual actions on others. In addition, people respond to environmental cues that imply
acceptable behavior within a given setting. Therefore, I now turn to the influence and effects of
ethical work climates on these relationships.
The Unique and Interactive Effects of Ethical Work Climates and Individual Moral
Reasoning
The construct of ethical work climate. Victor and Cullen (1988) proposed the most
commonly used ethical climate model. Victor and Cullen (1988) suggested that ethical climates
have a two-dimensional typology structure. The cross-tabulation of these two dimensions forms
nine different possible ethical climate types. The first dimension is ethical criterion, modeled
after Kohlberg’s (1958) theory of moral development. Thus, ethical climates vary in their level
of egoistic, benevolent, and principled moral perspectives. The second dimension is locus of
analysis. This dimension varies according to individual, local, and cosmopolitan levels. Thus,
an individual, egoistic climate would be one where selfish, “every man for himself” attitudes are
encouraged and rewarded. A local, egoistic climate would be characterized by company profit
taking precedence over all other motivations and regardless of social responsibilities. Finally, a
cosmopolitan, egoistic climate would be characterized by industry efficiency. Standardizing
business practices to maximize profits for all would be the extreme motivation at this level,
which likely would, along with the other egoistic climates, encourage Machiavellian values.
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Individual benevolent climates are strongly linked with personal friendships. This
climate fosters strong desires to contemplate the effects of behaviors on close others. On the
other hand, local benevolent climates go beyond personal friendships to take the interests of
teams into account when ethical decisions are made. Finally, a cosmopolitan benevolent climate
adheres to strict, social responsibility standards when forming ethical actions.
Individual principled climates suggest that personal moralities govern behavior. Trusting
individuals to ignore selfish motives or others’ interests to simply follow their own sense of
decency governs decisions within this climate level. Local principled climates encourage
individuals to follow company rules and procedures. Finally, cosmopolitan principled climates
are inherently sensitive to laws and professional codes that are deemed proper and legitimate for
ethical organizational behavior.
In all, Victor and Cullen (1988) proposed nine types to represent all possible ethical
climates that exist within organizations. One organization is likely to have varying levels of each
climate whereas another organization would have a different typological profile. Some climate
factors may not exist within an organization depending on the industry. When conducting a
varimax-rotated, principal components analysis, Victor and Cullen (1988) were able to observe
only five of the nine proposed factors (i.e., caring, laws and codes, rules, instrumental, and
independence). All three egoistic climates collapsed into one factor (i.e., instrumental), as did
the benevolent climates (i.e., caring). The principled climates reflected the locus of analysis
dimension (i.e., independence, rules, and laws and code). A recurring issue with the Victor and
Cullen (1988) framework is that, not only have researchers failed to support the proposed nine
types, but researchers also have failed to consistently find the same underlying factor structure.
For instance, Wimbush, Shepard, and Markham (1997a) found five factors but not the same five
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that Victor and Cullen (1988) observed. Some only found four factors (Barnett & Vaicys, 2000;
Wimbush, Shepard & Markham, 1997b). Others have uncovered six factors (Fritzche, 2000).
Interestingly, Vardi (2001) found three factors that mirrored the ethical criterion dimension (i.e.,
instrumental = egoistic, caring = benevolent, rules = principled). This inconsistency highlights a
problem with the ethical climate construct. That is, the different factor structures may be due to
two separate issues: poor measurement of the construct or model mis-specification. Neither
issue seems to be a major concern to researchers, as few have addressed either concern.
A second problem with the ethical climate concept is that very few studies have tested the
aggregated level of the ethical climate construct (Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2009). Victor
and Cullen (1988) described ethical climate as the shared perception of the ethical undertones of
the work environment and suggested that there would be more within group agreement than
between group agreement. Most researchers have failed to investigate the amount of agreement
among individuals. However, if there is substantial variance in climate construct at both the
individual and group level, then multilevel modeling would need to be used to account for nested
data.
Most have defended the individual level analysis on the grounds that these individual
perceptions of ethical climate are likely to have the greatest impact on ethical behaviors (Barnett
& Vaicys, 2000; Wimbush et al., 1997b). For instance, Fritzche (2000) assigned each individual
his/her highest rated ethical climate. However, this directly violates the conceptualization of the
construct for two reasons. One, useful information is eliminated by assigning one climate type
per individual. Most climate perceptions are made via self-report on a 7-point scale. For
instance, an individual can have similar levels of two different climates (i.e., 6.4 v. 6.5), yet an
individual is assigned the climate with a score of 6.5. This relates to the second reason why this
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practice violates the construct conceptualization: it assumes that the other ethical climates do not
affect behavior within the organization.
In light of these shortcomings, Arnaud (2010) developed a new model and measure of
ethical work climates. Arnaud (2010) suggested that Victor and Cullen’s (1988) framework had
two shortcomings: there was only one dimension (i.e., ethical criteria) rather than two and the
original dimensions were too narrowly defined by Victor and Cullen (1988). Arnaud (2010)
used Rest’s (1986) framework to broaden the number of ethical climate processes by
incorporating aspects of moral sensitivity (i.e., awareness), moral judgment, moral motivation
(i.e., moral vs. economic values) and moral character (i.e., behavior). Arnaud (2010) labeled this
new model the Psychological Process Model of ethical work climates. Resulting factor analyses
suggested that there were six factors measured by moral motivation, moral character, two subcomponents to moral sensitivity (i.e., norms of moral awareness and norms of empathetic
concern) and two sub-components to the judgment (i.e., directed towards self and others) factor.
Arnaud (2010) also suggested that, even though Rest’s (1986) original conceptualization existed
at the individual level, these processes exist at the collective level as well, given supporting
evidence regarding aggregation and agreement on the shared perception of these processes
among co-workers. Thus, the Psychological Process Model of ethical work climates improves
upon Victor and Cullen’s (1988) framework by testing agreement and then aggregating at the
collective level and by broadening the amount of processes that exist within a normative, ethical
work climate. Subsequent tests of the model and cross-validation efforts are needed to confirm
that this structure is stable.
Ethics training and codes of conduct. Before discussing the unique and interactive
effects of ethical work climates and individual moral reasoning on CWBs, it is important to
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discuss ethics training. Whereas ethics training is not a component of this study and I will not be
assessing the effects of training, it is relevant to the discussion of ethical work climates because
ethics trainers seek to improve the moral capacity of individuals to arrive at the best solutions to
ethical dilemmas. In other words, individuals post-training will achieve higher stages of moral
reasoning according to the Kohlberg framework. Also, the most common organizational
responses to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are to administer
ethics training to employees and to enact ethical codes of conduct (Palmer & Zakhem, 2001).
The use of ethics training implies that there are gaps between an individual’s current level of
moral reasoning and organizational expectations of moral reasoning and that training can fill this
gap. Ethics training also implies that ethical behavior can be improved at the individual level.
That is, much variance in ethical behavior can be attributed to, or explained by, individual ethical
cognition. Thus, I will discuss the purposes, common and best practices of ethics training, the
published literature on evaluations of ethics training, and potential limitations of ethics training
(and, by extension, individual moral reasoning) in explaining greater amounts of variance in
ethical behavior within organizations.
Much of the focus in ethics training has been on increasing the ability of students and
employees to reason more ethically in business contexts. These interventions often employ
scenario-based vignettes, role-plays, codes of conduct introductions, and group-based
discussions of ethical dilemmas. Some ethics training researchers have been pessimistic about
the effectiveness of these interventions in producing individual change (Allen, Bacdayan,
Kowalski, & Roy, 2005; Cragg, 1997; Frisque & Kolb, 2008; Izzo, 2000; Weber, 1990).
However, others have suggested that ethics training has improved individual ethical reasoning
(Fraedrich, Cherry, King, & Guo, 2005; Gautschi & Jones, 1998; Jones, 2009; Loe & Weeks,
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2000). Beneficial effects might be due to a multi-pronged approach when designing the training
seminars. For instance, some of the best practices of ethics training include role plays, case
studies and discussion, experientially-based cases, video instructions, games, organizational
simulations, mixed-mode deliveries (i.e., online and face-to-face), strategy development,
problem-solving approaches, and industry-specific concerns (Knouse & Giacolone, 1996;
LeClair & Ferrell, 2000; Mumford, et al., 2008; Ponemon, 1996; Sekerka, 2009).
The objective of ethics training is to raise awareness of ethical situations and to develop
the tools necessary to cope with and think through these dilemmas from a principled standpoint
(Rice & Dreilinger, 1990). Most ethics training studies are evaluated based on individual
responses to fictional dilemmas immediately after training. However, the transfer of these
responses to work behavior may be limited, as suggested by Borkowski and Ugras (1998). In a
meta-analytic investigation of business students and ethics, Borkowski and Ugras (1998)
suggested that “reacting more ethically to fictional dilemmas does not necessarily translate to
more ethical behavior when confronted by real-world situations” (pp. 1124). Indeed, Treviño
(1986) suggested that decisions in actual situations would yield lower levels of ethical decisions
(i.e., more egoistic, pre-conventional-type decisions) than judgments in fictional dilemmas
because of the personal consequences and situational cues that affect real-life decision-making.
In all likelihood, employees look to their environment for behavioral cues on what is
ethical/unethical within the organization.
Aside from ethics training improving individual moral reasoning skills, some have argued
that ethics training is but one part of an organization-wide initiative to develop an ethical culture
(Loescher, 2006). Ethics training can be a tool by which organizations disseminate knowledge,
structures, and procedures to employees on how to handle ethical situations. Also, administering
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ethics training may send a message to employees that ethics is important, should be taken
seriously, and is a part of the organizational culture. Evidence to date would suggest a modest
effect of ethics training in developing ethical culture (Valentine & Fleischman, 2004). Job
satisfaction seems to be a stronger indicator of ethical culture although the direction of this effect
is unknown due to the correlational nature of the data (Valentine, 2009; Valentine & Fleischman,
2004). For instance, it is possible that working in an ethical workplace would make the work or
job more satisfying because honest and fair work environments likely would yield less stressful
and more satisfying jobs. Regardless of the directionality, there are bound to be other variables
that explain variance in ethical behavior in the workplace.
Related to this point, others have argued that ethics training may not be sufficient for
improving ethical behavior within organizations (Fraedrich, Thorne & Ferrell, 1994). The
assumption of most ethics training studies is that teaching individuals higher-order moral
reasoning skills will suffice in improving ethical behavior. This is probably not the case very
often as contextual factors tend to guide individual reasoning and behaviors. However, very few
researchers have investigated the simultaneous effects of individual, situational, and
organizational antecedents on ethical behavior. This same point was noted by Kish-Gephart et
al. (2010). Thus, it is the ethical climate and culture that may play a greater role in influencing
behavior than the individual ability to reason morally.
As mentioned previously, codes of conduct are another organizational response to federal
anti-fraud legislation. Most organizations have an ethical code of conduct that is disseminated to
all employees. Ethical codes of conduct are used often as central teaching tools within the ethics
training framework. The rationale behind these codes is to enact a common, consultative guide
for how to behave when ethical dilemmas exist. The idea is that if there is some form of
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framework to consult, individuals will be more inclined to behave in a manner consistent with
business ethics.
Researchers have begun testing this proposition (Callan, 1992; Cleek & Leonard, 1998;
Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010). Unfortunately, merely instilling an ethical code of conduct does not
increase the levels of ethical decision-making or change individual attitudes within
organizations. For instance, in a survey of business people, Callan (1992) found that awareness
of, and use of, ethical codes of conduct did not predict self-reported ethical values. Using a
sample of business students, Cleek and Leonard (1998) found that students assigned to a
hypothetical organization with a code of ethics did not out-perform students from a fictitious
organization without a code of ethics on an ethical decision-making task. Cleek and Leonard
(1998) insinuated that it is not the presence of ethics codes in organizations that decreases the
level of unethical behavior but rather how these codes are communicated and practiced within
organizations. Indeed, using a sample of counseling graduate students, participants trained using
a problem-solving approach with ethical conduct codes outperformed control group participants
(Gawthrop & Uhlemann, 1992). Even more telling, these participants also outperformed those
trained with only access to ethical codes of conduct. The implication here is that practice with
codes of conduct enhances the effectiveness of these guides in mitigating unethical decisionmaking rather than their mere existence.
Moreover, although training involving practice with ethics codes is important for
decreasing unethical behavior, the enforcement of these codes is equally important for mitigating
unethical choices. Meta-analytic evidence supports this claim. Kish-Gephart, et al., (2010)
found that the effect of the presence of ethical codes of conduct on ethical choices was negligible
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whereas the enforcement of those codes was the strongest organizational antecedent of ethical
choices.
Indeed, researchers have expressed skepticism that learning from ethics training has
much of a role in ethical behavior when ethical climate is taken into account. Citing an
unpublished doctoral dissertation (Cunningham, 1991), Fraedrich, Thorne, and Ferrell (1994)
suggested that the application of cognitive moral development theory to business ethics contexts
may overlook the influence that unethical climates have on individual moral functioning.
Cunningham (1991) investigated ethical behavior within marketing and research agencies and
discovered that organizational factors (e.g., role conflict, weak ethical climates, hierarchical
organizational structures) were more predictive of ethical behavior than were individual moral
values. Zey-Ferrell, Weaver and Ferrell (1979) found that peers and opportunity were better
predictors of behavior than individual ethical belief systems. Similarly, Ferrell and Weaver
(1978) suggested that opportunity was a better predictor of ethical behavior than individual
beliefs. It is possible, then, that based on these studies, ethics training may not have much of an
impact on changing ethical behavior. If true, then the goal should be simply to raise the level of
awareness and recognition when ethical issues arise. Additionally, within organizations, it is
imperative to set up an environment to decrease unethical temptations and behavior (Gautschi &
Jones, 1998).
Unique effects. There are some practical and theoretical reasons to expect that
contextual factors would be more explanatory than individual factors in predicting unethical
behavior. Darley (1996) discussed some practical reasons why individuals would be inclined to
behave unethically. For instance, Darley (1996) reminded us that the primary reason for work is
to earn income to pay for goods and services that humans need to survive. When jobs are
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threatened for failure to comply with unethical demands, the pressure increases on employees to
comply with unethical requests. Certain factors such as high unemployment, personal
investments (e.g., mortgage, 401k, pension), and demographic factors (e.g., age) would
exacerbate the need to acquiesce. High profile examples such as The Dalkon Shield, Xerox
Corporation, and BF Goodrich exemplify this point.
Darley (1996) also mentioned diffusion and fragmentation of information and
responsibility as culprits for increasing the probability of unethical organizational actions. For
example, communication channels that are not well integrated might lead to situations in which
essential information about faulty products is not received by decision-makers. In addition,
when responsibility is not well defined by the organization, unethical breaches may occur
because individuals might perceive the breach is less likely to be traced back to them.
Finally, Darley (1996) cited sunk costs and escalation of commitment (Staw & Ross,
1987) as additional problems that organizations must overcome. Sunk costs occur when a welladvocated position is adopted and results show that the position does not follow individual
expectations, yet the culpable person “sinks” more money and resources into the cause. There
are multiple reasons for supporting a failing venture. If a venture has high start-up costs,
justifying “jumping ship” to investors may not be an option. Further, individuals’ jobs might be
at risk if they admit that their venture has failed. Thus, multiple factors are likely to influence
individuals to stay true (i.e., to maintain or escalate commitment) to endeavors and the increased
stakes might increase the likelihood of ethical breaches. Similarly, there is great social pressure
for individuals to remain consistent in their beliefs (Cialdini, 1999; 2003). Failure to be
consistent would likely yield unfavorable outcomes; thus, individuals tend to avoid situations
where inconsistencies may arise. Fleming and Zyglidopoulos (2008) suggested that
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organizational deception occurs after the first ethical breach to save face and reduce cognitive
dissonance. To the extent that the first breach goes undetected, then subsequent cover-ups are
more likely to occur (i.e., are rewarded).
In addition to the aforementioned practical reasons, there are theoretical reasons why
contextual factors might play a stronger role than individual belief systems in ethical behavior.
For instance, Cialdini and colleagues have developed norm focus theory whereby they
differentiated between descriptive and injunctive norms and suggested that it is not the mere
presence of either that triggers prosocial behavior but rather which type of norm is the focal
norm (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Kallgren, Reno, &
Cialdini, 2000; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). Cialdini et al. defined descriptive norms as
those that portray what people normally do in certain situations whereas injunctive norms supply
information on what is generally considered acceptable within a given situation. Thus, the latter
norm has more of a moral component than the former. Results supported the researchers’
hypothesis in that when injunctive norms were focal (i.e., when participants’ attention was
focused on the injunctive norm), injunctive norms had stronger effects on behavior across
situations and settings (Kallgren, et al., 2000; Reno et al., 1993). When descriptive norms were
focal, they only had an effect on behavior within the setting in which the norm was focal (i.e.,
they did not transfer across settings; Reno et al., 1993). Thus, if researchers want to change
behavior, they must focus individual attention on the moral aspects of the norm as opposed to the
descriptive aspects of what people actually do in situations.
More to the point in this discussion, Kallgren et al. (2000) expected and found that
personal norms (i.e., individual belief systems) were only effective in triggering prosocial
behavior when the environmental norm (i.e., an internal vs. external focus) was consistent with
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the personal norm. Personal norms were operationally defined as individual moral attitudes.
Environmental norms were operationally defined as cues to focus internally versus externally.
Specifically, experimental manipulations had participants focused on a TV screen that showed an
image of themselves or displayed geometric shapes. The researchers posited that the self-image
would trigger an internal focus and that an image unrelated to the self (i.e., geometric shapes)
would trigger an external focus. Participants were more likely to violate their personal norms
when they were externally focused than when they were internally focused. When they were
internally focused, individuals with high personal, anti-littering norms were less likely to litter
than individuals with low personal, anti-littering norms. However, there was no relationship
between personal norms and littering when individuals were externally focused. Thus, when
placed in a strong environment that is inconsistent with personal norms, an individual who has a
strong personal norm against littering (or other anti-social behaviors) will not behave in a way
that is consistent with his/her personal norm.
Case study: Enron. Ethical and unethical behavior often stems from subtle changes in
the environment that force individuals into making difficult choices. Some of these choices may
run counter to individual moral codes. The Enron scandal provided anecdotal evidence related to
this point. For instance, Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development at Enron,
was a prime whistleblower in the 2001 scandal. She suggested that there were three factors
influencing the breakdown in moral codes that eventually lead to the downfall of the company:
(1) the performance review system (i.e., “rank and yank”), (2) charismatic leadership, and (3)
external and internal structural opportunities (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). The “rank-and-yank”
performance review system resulted in the bottom 10-15% of performers losing their positions.
This created a culture in which individuals were engaging in risky, unethical behavior (e.g.,
35

fabricating sales goals) so that they could save their jobs. Watkins also stated that whereas
charisma can be a beneficial leadership style, taken to extremes, charisma can be destructive to
the long-term future of the organization. Finally, structural opportunities, such as accounting
loopholes, further drove employees to engage in risky behaviors. Whereas she contended that
charismatic leadership was one component that led to the downfall of the company, she did not
single out any single employee as the sole culprit. Rather, she suggested that it was a
conglomeration of factors that produced a system that was wholly unethical. Yet, much of the
public scrutiny and subsequent subpoenas suggested that it was entirely the fault of a few
individuals (e.g., Kenneth Lay and Jeff Skilling). In light of this, someone might ask whether
Enron was lead by, or comprised of, corrupt individuals, or whether there were multiple factors
that created a corrupt environment that influenced individuals to behave unethically?
Nonetheless, there has been little research that simultaneously investigated organizational
and individual level variables on behavioral outcomes (Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010). Using
structural equation modeling, Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) identified multiple individual,
situational, and organizational antecedents. Within individual antecedents, they found that each
specific individual antecedent accounted for unique variance in ethical choices, controlling for
other individual antecedents. Kish-Gephart, et al. (2010) also found similar patterns of effects
for both situational and organizational antecedents. Given that few primary studies examined
more than one type of antecedent per study, the authors did not find it justifiable to test the
unique effects across antecedent types but only within each type. Given the dearth of studies
investigating both individual and organizational antecedents simultaneously and testing for
unique effects, I propose to investigate the unique effects of individual moral reasoning and
ethical climates on CWBs. Kish-Gephart et al. (2010) found that both organizational and
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individual variables predict unethical choices, but we do not know to what extent they explain
unique variance. Therefore, I posed this issue as a research question. I expected both moral
reasoning and ethical climates would explain unique variance in CWBs but that ethical climates
would explain incremental variance, controlling for individual moral reasoning.
Research Question 1: Do ethical work climates explain incremental variance in CWBs,
controlling for individual moral reasoning?
In addition, given the nature of the data sample, I will analyze the ethical climate
construct as an individual perception of the ethical work environments. As stated prior, ethical
work climate is conceptualized as a shared perception that results in the aggregation of individual
perceptions. This assumes that there has been adequate agreement between individuals. Given
that all individuals within the data sample reside in singularly different organizations,
aggregating the data is impossible and implausible. Therefore, all variables regarding
Hypothesis 4 will be assessed at the individual level.
Interactive effects. An alternative, yet related notion is that ethical climates may
moderate the relationship between individual moral reasoning and ethical behavior. There have
been two models of the ethical decision-making process. One model proposed that individual,
situational, and organizational factors influenced individual decision-making directly as opposed
to interacting in their effects (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985). Indeed, Ferrell and Gresham (1985)
added feedback loops, suggesting that evaluation of the consequences of one’s own behavior
(i.e., ethical or unethical) affects individual (e.g., values, attitudes, intentions) and situational
(e.g., rewards/punishments, differential associations, roles) variables. Another interesting
component of the Ferrell and Gresham model is that they introduced the idea that the ratio of
unethical peers to ethical peers is a key component of an individual’s environment in influencing
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his/her own ethical choices. Hierarchical distance and frequency of interaction between self,
peers and superiors also factors into the impact that the ratio variable plays in influencing ethical
choices. Along with peer influences, opportunity to engage in unethical behaviors governed by
codes of conduct, policies, and rewards/punishment tend to influence the extent to which
individuals engage in ethical behaviors, independent of individual belief systems (Ferrell &
Weaver, 1978; Zey-Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982; Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, & Ferrell, 1979).
Treviño (1986) proposed an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. She
suggested that situational variables (such as organizational cultures, work characteristics, and job
context) moderate the effect of individual moral reasoning on ethical behavior. However,
Treviño (1986) did not propose a direct link from these situational variables to ethical behavior.
Preliminary tests have supported the interactionist model. Treviño and Youngblood (1990),
using an in-basket experiment, found little support for their interactionist model. However, postexperimental debriefing showed that participants expressed surprise at the low level of
punishment for those acting unethically in the scenarios and too much reward for those who
acted ethically in the scenarios. Thus, there was a lack of authenticity to the experimental
manipulations. As a replication, Ashkanasy, Windsor and Treviño (2006) improved the
experiment and found support for the interactionist model, observing that the relationship
between cognitive moral reasoning and ethical decision-making was moderated by outcome
expectancies (i.e., beliefs about the extent to which ethical behaviors are rewarded or punished).
Pre-conventional individuals made more unethical decisions as their outcome expectancies
increased (i.e., believed unethical behaviors would be rewarded) whereas post-conventional
individuals made less unethical decisions as expectancies decreased. Conventional individuals
were unaffected by the level of expectancies in their ethical decision-making behaviors.
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In a field experiment regarding theft, Greenberg (2002) reported a three-way interaction
involving the victim of theft, the presence of ethics programs, and cognitive moral reasoning
level. When the victim was an individual, very few participants stole regardless of the presence
of ethics programs or level of explicit moral reasoning. However, when the victim was the
organization, pre-conventional participants stole regardless of ethics program presence whereas
conventional participants only stole when ethics programs were not in place. In a study of
whistleblowing intentions, Zhang, Chiu, and Wei (2010) also found a three-way interaction
involving ethical culture, positive mood, and intentions such that people in positive moods
within ethical cultures were most likely to intend to whistleblow.
The above discussion provided a few examples of recent research that has investigated
the multiple factors that impact ethical behaviors. Below, I will attempt to describe the
hypotheses that I will test regarding contextual moderators of the effects of individual reasoning
on CWBs.
I posit that Rest’s (1979) model of individual moral reasoning provides a working
framework for examining differential effects of individual moral reasoning levels on CWBs,
depending on the particular level of ethical work climates. I propose a hypothesized model (see
Figure 1) of the ethical reasoning-CWB relationship moderated by ethical work climates. As a
reminder, I have chosen to use Arnaud’s (2010) framework to examine ethical work climates.
As such, I will explain the different types of climates that exist according to Arnaud (2010).
Arnaud (2010) uncovered six factors that roughly corresponded to Rest’s (1986) process
model. The first two factors correspond to the idea of collective moral sensitivity. The first
factor reflects moral awareness such that people working within this climate type have a sense of
knowledge, understanding, and recognition about when an ethical situation arises. Similarly,
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collective empathetic concern deals with issues of feeling empathy for others when situations
arise that require camaraderie. The next two factors correspond to collective moral judgments.
One is self-oriented (e.g., personal benefit, personal welfare, profit, efficiency) whereas the other
is other-oriented (e.g., doing what’s right for society or workgroups). The fifth factor is termed
collective moral motivation. High collective moral motivation occurs when ethical concerns
trump other concerns (i.e., economic) when forming decisions. Finally, the sixth factor
corresponds to collective moral character. This describes what the group or organization actually
does during ethical situations.
Thus, I now will explain the different forms of relationship between self- and otheroriented climates when moderating the moral reasoning-CWB relationship. I expect to see the
same form of relationships for all of the other ethical work climates (i.e., MS = moral sensitivity
– awareness and moral sensitivity – empathetic concern, MM = moral motivation and MC =
moral character), as they have similar connotations. I expect low and high levels of these
climates will align with the self- vs. other-oriented climates. For instance, low MS, MM, and
MC climates will follow the same pattern of effects as self-oriented climates whereas high MS,
MM, and MC climates will follow the same pattern of effects as other-oriented climates.
Specifically, I propose that individuals in the pre-conventional and conventional levels of
moral reasoning working in self-oriented climates would have a higher probability of engaging
in CWBs. Pre-conventional individuals tend to engage in “bad behavior,” regardless of
environment. However, because conventional individuals are highly susceptible to
environmental cues whereas pre- and post-conventional individuals are not as susceptible,
conventional individuals are likely to behave in ways consistent with organizational norms.
Therefore, these individuals would have a lower probability of committing CWBs when the
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climate provides cues that stress the other-oriented nature of collective moral judgments.
However, the likelihood of post-conventional individuals committing CWBs would be low in
either self- or other-oriented work climates. I hypothesize that these individuals would be
resistant to self-oriented cues due to their strong, dispositional nature towards principled values.
Pre-conventional individuals working in self- or other-oriented work climates may still gravitate
towards CWBs because of the “bad apple” syndrome (Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010; Weber, 1990).
This hypothesis suggests that the effect of ethical work climates on moderating the moral
reasoning-CWB relationship is non-linear such that the strength of the relationship for selforiented climates is negative and weak and becomes more strongly negative as it approaches
post-conventional reasoning. The opposite would be true for other-oriented climates. I would
expect to see a strong, negative slope, followed by a weak asymptote from conventional to postconventional reasoning.

High
Self/Lo MS/MM/MC

CWBs

Other/Hi MS/MM/MC

Low

Pre

Con

Post

Moral Reasoning
Figure 1. Ethical Climates moderating the
Moral Reasoning-CWB relationship.
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Hypothesis 4: Ethical work climates will moderate the moral reasoning-CWB
relationship.
Method
Pilot Study
For information about the pilot study, including participant, procedural and validation
information, see Appendix A.
Participants
Participants were recruited for this study based on two sources. The majority of
participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service (i.e., Mturk). Mturk is a
service whereby requesters solicit services to be completed by online workers. Empirical
research comparing Mturk samples with traditional samples (e.g., college undergraduates) has
suggested that Mturk samples either differ very little from these traditional samples (Barger,
Behrend, Sharek, & Sinar, 2011). Participants received $1.50 in exchange for participation. To
further increase data quality, participants were offered a bonus of $0.25 if they engaged in
effortful responding. I assessed effortful responses with the RTE index (see Appendix A for
discussion of RTE index). RTE ≥ .900 qualified participants for the bonus. I recruited 400
participants using the Mturk service. Given that Amazon is an international service, English was
not the first language for all of the participants. Only 207 of the 400 participants reported that
English was their first language. Therefore, 207 participants were used for the analyses in order
to control for the potential language confound.
Additional data was collected from students enrolled in an MBA program at a large,
Midwestern university. The purpose of the second data collection was to increase the sample
size for English-speaking participants. Participants from this sample were given extra credit
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towards their grade in an Organizational Behavior course. The results of this data collection
yielded 14 participants, 13 of whom reported English as their first language. Thus, there were a
total of 220 participants suitable for data analysis.
Data suggested that the sample variable (i.e., Mturk vs. MBA) correlated with race (r = .18), full/part-time status (r = -.25), and ethical work climate (r = -.16). Hence, there were more
minorities and full-time workers in the Mturk sample, compared with the MBA sample. Also,
MBA participants were more likely to have worked in unethical work climates, compared with
Mturk participants. However, these relationships may be spurious due to the small size of the
MBA sample (13 participants vs. 207 participants).
The average age of participants is 30.82 years (SD = 8.93). Most (66%) of the
participants were male, 46% of the sample was White and 41% was Asian/Pacific, and 54% of
participants were from the United States with India comprising 36% of the sample. These
individuals had an average of 11.04 years of work experience with an average tenure with
current employer of 3.65 years. The average size of companies where individuals are currently
employed was approximately 4,000 employees (SD = 14500.04). Most (68%) of the sample had
at least a Bachelor’s Degree. About half (51%) of the sample was single and never married
whereas 38% of the sample was currently married. Some (32%) of the sample reported that they
were Hindu, with Protestant Christian (18%) and Other (12%) reflecting the next two most
frequent religions. Most (94%) of the sample was currently employed, 69% of whom were
employed full-time. The largest industry represented in this sample was the Services industry
(23%), followed by Other (22%), Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (13%), Manufacturing
(11%), Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services (8%), Retail Trade
(7%), Public Administration (7%), Construction (3%), Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (1%),
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and Mining (1%). The remaining 5% were either unemployed or stay-at-home parents.
Approximately 60% of the sample reported having ethics training before the study, with an
average report of 10.68 hours per person.
Measures
Explicit moral reasoning. The 3-story, short-form version of the Defining Issues Test
(i.e., DIT-1) was administered to all participants (Rest, 1979). This test consisted of 3 ethical
dilemma vignettes (Heinz and the Drug, Prisoner, Newspaper). I used the short-form of this test
(rather than the 5-story version) due to concerns about total survey length and fatigue. After
each presented vignette, respondents made a decision (e.g., steal, can’t decide, don’t steal).
Respondents then rated twelve issues on a scale of 1 to 5, regarding how important that particular
issue was in formulating their own decision. Finally, respondents rank ordered the four most
important issues that respondents used in formulating their decision. I used the P index, i.e., the
P-score, to evaluate individual levels of moral development. The P index weights the rankordered issues according to whether the issues belonged to the stage of principled reasoning (i.e.,
Stage 5 and 6 of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development). Thus, if a participant ranked a
principled reasoning issue as the most important, the participant received a score of 4. If the
second issue was also from the principled reasoning stage, then the participant received a score
of 3, and so on. These scores are summed together across all three stories to compute a
composite P index. Higher scores signified greater amounts of principled reasoning that
individuals used to form moral decisions. The reported internal consistency reliability for this
measure is .81 (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999). Internal consistency for this study was
.83. A sample vignette can be seen in Appendix B.
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Business Ethics Cognitive Structure (BECS). To assess the cognitive structures of
participants’ conceptualizations of business ethics, I developed a measure using structural
assessment. Participants performed a paired-comparison rating task whereby they rated the
similarity between 11 business ethics concepts. On a 7-point scale from (1 = Unrelated, 7 =
Related), participants rated the relatedness of items such as “culture of integrity” and
“organizational cultures.” Specifically, there were 55 total comparisons [(n(n - 1)/2)  (11(111)/2)=55]. For details on the development of the concept items and their origins, see Appendix
A. I submitted the raw ratings to PathFinder (Schvaneveldt, 1990) to derive a structural network
for each individual. PathFinder computes two metrics for each individual. The first metric is the
coherence index, which is a referent-free metric that approximates an assessment of internal
consistency. Essentially, the correlation between two concepts is compared with the correlations
with all other possible pairs of concepts. This metric varies from 0 to 1 but can be negative. The
second metric is the similarity index whereby individual structures are compared with referent
experts (i.e., nominated subject matter experts, SMEs, in the field of business ethics).
To calculate a similarity index required that I first create an average SME structure
against which to compare participants’ structures. Thus, I averaged the comparison ratings
obtained from three subject matter experts. Averaging across SMEs increases reliability of the
referent expert network. All SMEs were white males from the United States, spoke English as a
first language, and possessed at least a Masters Degree. SME 1 was aged 48 with 26 years of
experience in the field of ethics and compliance, SME 2 also was 48 years of age but with 17
years of experience in the field of ethics and compliance, and SME 3 was 65 years old with 25
years of experience in the field of ethics and compliance. Coherence indexes for the three SMEs
were .35, .55, and .39, respectively. Coherence for experts can vary from .25 to .8 (Roger
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Schvaneveldt, personal communication, April 10, 2012). When averaged together, coherence
was .54. Averaging across pairs of experts achieves slightly differing results. For instance, the
best coherence index was observed between SME 1 and 2 (C = .67). Coherence between SME 1
and 3 was .56 whereas the lowest coherence was observed between SME 2 and 5 (C = .47).
One area that structural assessment and PathFinder research has not addressed is
assessing the level of agreement between referent experts to justify combining. Therefore, I used
the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) to help ascertain if I should combine referent experts
and which referent experts would be most viable to combine. Using a two-way random effects
average measures model with consistency agreement, I compared the ICC (2, k) across all 4
possible combinations. All three SMEs averaged together resulted in an ICC of .94. The ICC
for SME 1 and 2 was .97. The ICC for SME 2 and 3 was .96. The ICC for SME 1 and 3 did not
converge (due to negative average covariance among items). Overall, these results portrayed
two things: (1) any combination was justifiable given the coherence indexes and ICCs and (2),
in particular, combining SMEs 1 and 2 exhibited the highest coherence index as well as ICC.
Therefore, the referent network used to compute the similarity index was between SME 1 and 2.
The structural network for the average ratings of SME 1 and 2 can be found in Figure 2.
Internal consistency was computed on the raw ratings of all 55 comparisons and
exceeded the minimum acceptable threshold for reliability (α = .95). The concept items can be
seen in Appendix C.
IAT-M. Categories and items were adapted from existing IATs that tested moral selfconcepts (Perugini & Leone, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2010) to assess implicit moral reasoning.
Participants completed five blocks of trials. I elected to use a single-target IAT version that has
become more commonplace within the past decade. This decision was the result of both the
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personalization of the IAT category (as opposed to the more common “good/bad” or
“pleasant/unpleasant” attribute categories) and the ambiguity associated with the “other”
category. Some research has suggested that this category label is too ambiguous in that each
individual may have a different referent “other” that s/he uses and that use of different referent
“others” may lead to extraneous noise in the measurement of implicit self-concept (Han, Czellar,
Olson, & Fazio, 2010). Therefore, I chose to use the single category of “me” as a potential
remedy for this artifact. To assess internal consistency, a correlation was computed between the
first test and practice blocks (r = .39). This correlation was consistent with prior research
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). Additional explanations of the process and category words
are in Appendix D.
Ethical work climate. To assess ethical work climate perceptions, I used items from
both the Ethical Climate Index (i.e., ECI) measure developed by Arnaud (2010) as well as items
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Figure 2. Structural Network for Average Ratings of SME 1 and 2
from Victor and Cullen’s (1988) measure. For an explanation of the factor analytic process that
took place in the pilot study, see Appendix A. The result of this process was a 15-item, single
factor solution. Internal consistency reliability was high (α = .92). Items can be found in
Appendix E. Respondents used a 7-point, Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly
Agree). Higher scores indicated more ethical work climates.
Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs). There were two separate assessments of
CWBs for this study. I used 20 items from the 66-item measure developed by Gruys and Sackett
(2003). For this measure, respondents reported how likely it was that they would engage in the
behavior in the future given a wide variety of circumstances. Participants responded using a 748

point Likert-type scale (1 = Low Likelihood; 7 = High Likelihood). Thus, this measure served as
more of an assessment of behavioral intentions than as a self-report of behavioral frequency.
Using this type of anchoring scale, I avoided situations in which it was not possible to perform a
certain behavior on the job, which was a criticism of prior self-reported CWB measures. Thus,
this scale format allowed all respondents the possibility of engaging in such behaviors. Internal
consistency alphas ranged from .59-.90 for the 11 categories of behaviors. The 20 items chosen
for this study were based on their observed mean frequencies, which were the highest of all 66
behaviors. The internal consistency for this behavioral intentions factor was .94. Higher scores
indicated higher CWB intentions.
In addition, I also assessed behavioral frequency by administering the Bennett and
Robinson (2000) measure. This measure is a two-factor, 19-item measure that assesses
interpersonal and organizational CWBs. This measure inquires about the frequency with which
individuals engaged in the behavior in the past. Participants responded using a 7-point, Likerttype scale (1 = Never; 7 = Daily). Internal consistencies for interpersonal and organizational
CWBs were .93 and .95, respectively. Higher scores indicated higher interpersonal and
organizational CWBs.
Whereas it might objectionable to use self-report data for all variables, in particular for
CWBs given the motivation for participants to engage in ego enhancement, it is important to note
that self-reports of CWBs are moderately to strongly correlated with other-reports of CWBs
(Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt, 2012), and their nomological relationships between antecedents
and CWBs did not differ appreciably depending on the sampling method (Fox, Spector, Goh, &
Bruursema, 2007). Thus, I felt confident with the chosen design method. Items can be found in
Appendix F.
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Job satisfaction. I used a 3-item measure of global job satisfaction called the Michigan
Organizational Assessment Questionnaire-Job Satisfaction Subscale (Cammann, Fichman,
Jenkins, & Klesh, 1979; 1983). The meta-analytically-derived, unweighted M alpha is .85
(Bowling & Hammond, 2008). Participants responded using a 7-point, Likert-type scale (1 =
Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree). For this study, the reported internal consistency was
.74. Higher scores indicated higher satisfaction. These items can be found in Appendix G.
Big 5 personality. I used a 50-item measure of the Big 5 personality variables (i.e.,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, and neuroticism)
developed by the International Personality Item Pool (i.e., IPIP). Participants responded using a
5-point, Likert-type scale (1 = Very Inaccurate; 5 = Very Accurate). Internal consistency
reliability analyses were adequate for all five personality traits, ranging from .77 to .86. For this
study, the reported alphas for conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness to
experience and neuroticism were .78, .76, .77, .72, and .82, respectively. Higher scores indicated
higher levels of the attributes. This measure can be found in Appendix H.
Demographics. Participants self-reported their age, gender, race, language, cognitive
ability (i.e., ACT and SAT scores if known or taken), years of work experience, marital status,
religious affiliation, current employment status, type of employment status (i.e., full- or parttime), salary, tenure with current employer, company size, industry, level of education and ethics
training experience. These questions can be located in Appendix I.
Impression Management. Participants completed a 40-item assessment of impression
management. This measure is called the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR;
Paulhus, 1991). The purpose of this measure was to control for and assess the extent to which
participants were not responding honestly or were presenting themselves favorably. This
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measure has two sub-scales: impression management and self-deception. The former assesses
explicit processes (over-reporting favorable behaviors and under-reporting unfavorable
behaviors) whereas the latter assesses implicit processes (e.g., ego enhancement). Participants
responded on a 7-point, Likert-type scale, (1 = “Not True”; 7 = “Very True”). The measure has
an internal consistency reliability of approximately .83. The internal consistencies for the
impression management (α = .75) and self-deception (α = .69) scales for this study were
adequate. Items can be located in Appendix J.
Procedure
Participants were recruited using both the Mturk service and from an MBA program. For
Mturk, the study was advertised with other work and research projects (at the time,
approximately 500,000 workers could work on approximately 350,000 different projects). I
provided a brief description on the Mturk website of the study requirements (both participant and
computer requirements) as well as basic tasks to be performed during the study session. If
participants were interested in completing the work request, they agreed and then were able to
access the web link from the millisecond.com server. Millisecond uses Inquisit software to
administer the IAT and other surveys. MBA participants were recruited through a professor of
an Organizational Behavior course. An email advertisement was sent out to current students in
this class as well as past students. The professor also announced the opportunity in class to
maximize the level of awareness in order to participate. The reward for participation was extra
credit applied toward the student’s course grade. Both sets of participants were provided access
to the web link. Once participants click on the web link, they were provided a cover letter that
acted as informed consent (Appendix K). Clicking the ‘next’ button verified that participants
understood their rights, the risks and benefits of participation and the expectations of the study.
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Once they clicked the ‘next’ button, participants took the IAT-M first to avoid potential bias
from completing other prior surveys. Then, participants completed the following tasks and
surveys in this order: BECS, DIT, EWC, Job Satisfaction, CWBs, Big 5, BIDR, and
demographics. Following completion of the survey instruments, individuals were debriefed and
compensated for their participation.
Results
Analytic Approach
I calculated descriptive and frequency statistics, including means, standard deviations,
and correlations, to provide basic information about the study variables. I used hierarchical
multiple regression to examine the hypotheses. Specifically, I tested the unique effects of ethicsrelated variables, above and beyond other ethics-related variables as well as control variables. I
used ΔR2 to assess the relative contribution of these variables. When it was appropriate to test
for interactions, I mean-centered variables before testing for interaction effects to avoid potential
multicollinearity problems. I also examined evidence of convergent, divergent, and criterionrelated validity by investigating the correlation matrix. In particular, I expected the DIT, BECS
and IAT-M to converge, as they measure similar constructs. I also anticipated that these
measures would display divergent validity as I did not expect them to be strongly correlated with
demographic variables.
Outliers
I examined participants (for whom English was their first language) in the dataset for
outliers, looking for outliers in any variables used in analyses as well as demographic variables.
I identified and omitted outliers using the outlier labeling rule (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987;
Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986; Tukey, 1977). The outlier labeling rule proferred by Tukey
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and colleagues assesses the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile multiplied by a
constant (e.g., 2.2). Statistical simulations of this procedure suggested that it outperformed the
two standard deviation rule by correctly keeping cases that the two standard deviation rule
suggested were outliers (Hoaglin, et al., 1986).
The outlier labeling rule for this study did not identify any outliers in the hypothesized
variables. There was one outlier on extraversion. The outlier labeling rule identified a few
outliers on demographic variables. For instance, there were two outliers for work experience, ten
for tenure, 18 for company size, eight for training hours, three for cognitive ability, three for age,
and nine for salary. Given that the hypothesized variables contained zero outliers, no
participants were excluded on this basis, and the effect of outliers on the primary analyses was
negligible.
Response Time Effort
For a detailed description and understanding of the response time effort (RTE) variable,
see Appendix A (Pilot Study). Because response latencies are not immune to inferential leaps on
the part of researchers, I chose to omit far less data for the full study analyses than the pilot
study. Quick responding may be the result of familiarity with the response options, scale items,
or both. Internal consistency data for all variables (see Table 1) indicated that overall, using the
total sample resulted in adequate reliability for all variables (i.e., alpha ≥ .70 for every variable
except Self-Deception, which was .69). Using RTE ≥ .900 as a threshold increased reliability on
some variables but not others. In fact, for some variables reliability actually decreased with the
more stringent threshold. Overall, the average increase in reliability was only .02 from Total
Sample to RTE ≥ .900. Because of this and the fact that using stringent thresholds for omitting
data with the RTE variable (i.e., greater than or equal to .900) resulted in the omission of too
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many participants, I elected to use the RTE variable to omit only the most egregious examples of
effortless responding. Thus, I omitted eight participants who had RTE scores less than .100.
Table 1
Internal Consistency at Differing RTE Levels

Variable

Total

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

EWC

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.92

Conscientiousness

0.78

0.78

0.78

0.77

0.77

0.77

0.77

0.79

0.79

0.80

Neuroticism

0.81

0.82

0.84

0.84

0.85

0.85

0.86

0.88

0.88

0.89

Agreeableness

0.77

0.77

0.78

0.79

0.80

0.80

0.81

0.82

0.82

0.83

Extraversion

0.75

0.76

0.79

0.80

0.81

0.82

0.82

0.84

0.85

0.86

Openness

0.72

0.72

0.73

0.72

0.72

0.72

0.72

0.73

0.74

0.75

Job Satisfaction

0.74

0.74

0.81

0.83

0.83

0.84

0.88

0.90

0.90

0.91

CWB Intentions

0.94

0.94

0.94

0.93

0.93

0.93

0.92

0.92

0.92

0.91

CWB Interpersonal

0.93

0.93

0.92

0.92

0.91

0.91

0.91

0.90

0.90

0.86

CWB Organizational

0.95

0.95

0.94

0.92

0.91

0.91

0.91

0.90

0.90

0.88

Impression Mgt

0.74

0.75

0.77

0.78

0.79

0.79

0.80

0.80

0.81

0.82

Self-Deception

0.69

0.69

0.72

0.73

0.73

0.74

0.74

0.74

0.74

0.75

IAT

0.42

0.39

BECS

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.95**

Pscore

0.83

0.83

0.83

0.84

0.84

0.84

0.84

0.84

0.84

0.82***

Average

0.80

0.80

0.33*

0.82

* Based on correlation between practice and test blocks, not Cronbach’s alpha
**Based on raw ratings of all 55 paired comparison items
***Based on the raw ratings of each issue across all three stories
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This criterion identified respondents who put forth effort less than 10% of the time. This
criterion resulted in deleting approximately 4% of the participants, deleting a percentage of
participants that is consistent with prior research. Therefore, the sample size for the primary
analyses decreased from 220 to 212 participants. If I had used RTE ≥ .900 as a criterion, the
sample size would have decreased from 212 to 133, resulting in the omission of 79 participants
instead of 8.
Control Variables: Culture and Sample
Culture. To assess culture as a potential confound in the hypothesized relationships, I
tested the relationship between coherence and three dependent variables (i.e., CWB-I, CWB-O,
and CWB intentions) while controlling for each of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (i.e.,
Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Power Distance). I identified the
cultural score based on Hofstede’s dimensions for the country of each participant (Hofstede,
1980). I entered coherence, a cultural dimension, and their interaction as factors in the model. I
used Type III sums of squares because they provided a more conservative test than Type I sums
of squares and allowed me to assess the unique effects of each variable. To stringently control
for any effects of culture, I used the criterion of p < .25 to retain a culture main or interaction
term in further analyses. The results of each test can be found in Tables 2 through 4.
I observed a significant interaction only between uncertainty avoidance and coherence in
their effects on CWB-I. Individualism and power distance were positively related to CWB-I.
Thus, for all subsequent tests involving CWB-I, I modeled these main effects as well as the main
and interaction effects for uncertainty avoidance and coherence.
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Table 2
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions X Coherence Effects on CWBI (ANCOVAs)

Cultural Dimension

df

F

p

partial η2

Individualism

1

7.151

.008

.034*

Coherence

1

2.547

.112

.012

Individualism*coh

1

0.081

.776

.000

Power Distance

1

8.976

.003

.042*

Coherence

1

1.167

.281

.006

Power Distance*coh

1

0.142

.707

.001

Masculinity

1

2.346

.127

.011

Coherence

1

1.599

.207

.008

Masculinity*coh

1

0.734

.393

.004

Uncertainty Avoidance

1

8.394

.004

.039*

Coherence

1

5.672

.018

.027*

Uncertainty Avoidance*coh 1

3.644

.058

.017*

*Statistically significant (Main Effects p < .05; Interactions p < .25)
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Table 3
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions X Coherence Effects on CWBO (ANCOVAs)

Cultural Dimension

df

F

p

partial η2

Individualism

1

2.463

.118

.012

Coherence

1

2.265

.134

.011

Individualism*coh

1

0.094

.760

.000

Power Distance

1

2.640

.106

.013

Coherence

1

1.110

.293

.005

Power Distance*coh

1

0.085

.771

.000

Masculinity

1

0.460

.498

.002

Coherence

1

0.578

.448

.003

Masculinity*coh

1

0.153

.696

.001

Uncertainty Avoidance

1

1.100

.295

.005

Coherence

1

1.229

.269

.006

Uncertainty Avoidance*coh 1

0.468

.495

.002
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Table 4
Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions X Coherence Effects on CWB Intentions (ANCOVAs)

Cultural Dimension

df

F

p

partial η2

Individualism

1

1.331

.250

.006

Coherence

1

2.430

.121

.012

Individualism*coh

1

0.802

.372

.004

Power Distance

1

0.784

.377

.004

Coherence

1

0.004

.951

.004

Power Distance*coh

1

0.794

.374

.004

Masculinity

1

0.027

.870

.000

Coherence

1

0.050

.824

.000

Masculinity*coh

1

0.000

.993

.000

Uncertainty Avoidance

1

0.444

.506

.002

Coherence

1

0.396

.530

.002

Uncertainty Avoidance*coh 1

0.149

.700

.001

Sample. To determine whether relationships varied as a result of sample differences
(Mturk vs. MBA), I also employed a Type III sums of squares, univariate analysis of covariance
test with an interaction term. Type III sums of squares allowed an adequate test of the sample
variable because it offered a test of the unique effects of the sample main and interaction effects
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and also because the variable had unequal cell sizes. To stringently control for the effects of
sample, I again used a criterion of p < .25 to decide whether to retain the main or interaction
effect in subsequent analyses. Results can be found in Table 5.
The results revealed that none of the interaction terms approached the .25 threshold.
However, there was a main effect of sample on CWBI. Therefore, I modeled sample as a main
effect in analyses using CWBI as an outcome.
Correlations, Alphas, and Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 provides correlations for all relevant variables in the study. Along the diagonals,
I reported the internal consistency alphas for all appropriate variables. In addition, I reported
descriptive statistics (i.e., N, means, and standard deviations) for all variables in Columns 3, 4,
and 5, respectively.
BECS Validity
Prior to testing my hypotheses, I first needed to examine evidence of reliability of the
BECS, to examine evidence of its convergent, divergent, and criterion-related validity, and to
investigate antecedents of ethical schemas.
Descriptives and reliability. The average coherence (M = .19, SD = .30) and similarity
(M = .23, SD = .09) indexes were similar to levels reported in prior research using PathFinder to
extract structural networks (Schvaneveldt, 1990). I computed Cronbach’s alpha for the 55 paired
comparison ratings, which resulted in an acceptable internal consistency (α = .95).
Convergent validity. To ensure that the measure is assessing its intended construct, it
was important to correlate the new measure with existing measures that relate to but still are
distinct from the newly created measure. Therefore, I assessed convergent validity of the BECS
measure by correlating the two indexes with an individual’s P-score, IAT-M, and each other.
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Table 5
Sample X Coherence Effects on CWBs (ANCOVAs)

p

partial η2

7.572

.006

.035*

1

27.499

.000

.117*

Sample*coh

1

0.941

.333

.005

Sample

1

2.655

.105

.013

Coherence

1

21.955

.000

.095*

Sample*coh

1

0.757

.385

.004

Sample

1

0.096

.757

.000

Coherence

1

7.643

.006

.035*

Sample*coh

1

0.805

.371

.004

Outcome

Variable

df

CWB-I

Sample

1

Coherence

CWB-O

CWB-Intentions

F

*Statistically Significant (Main Effect p < .05; Interaction p < .25)
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Table 6
Correlation Matrix
Variable

N

M

SD

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2

3

4

5

CWBI
213
2.48
1.47
0.93
CWBO
213
2.51
1.37
0.95
0.86
CWBINT
213
2.94
1.29
0.94
0.71
0.84
EWC
213
5.04
1.02
0.92
-0.23
-0.28
-0.26
Coherence
212
0.19
0.30
0.95
-0.33
-0.30
-0.18
0.26
Similarity
212
0.23
0.09
-0.13
-0.09
0.09
-0.16
0.34
IAT
209
0.15
0.36
0.12
-0.29
-0.24
-0.15
0.16
Pscore
214
7.41
4.89
-0.04
-0.08
-0.24
-0.15
0.31
Impression
9 Management
214
6.14
4.40
-0.44
-0.47
-0.49
0.28
0.27
10 Self-Deception
214
6.06
4.22
-0.35
-0.41
-0.39
0.32
0.23
11 Extraversion
212
3.26
0.66
0.10
-0.17
-0.16
-0.19
0.21
12 Conscientiousness
213
3.73
0.67
-0.54
-0.61
-0.55
0.32
0.39
13 Neuroticism
213
2.53
0.80
0.33
0.39
0.34
-0.32
-0.27
14 Openness
213
3.64
0.66
0.12
-0.39
-0.32
-0.27
0.27
15 Agreeableness
213
3.64
0.67
-0.55
-0.51
-0.48
0.31
0.33
16 Job Satisfaction
213
5.17
1.39
-0.29
-0.40
-0.39
0.58
0.17
17 Age
211
30.82
8.93
-0.12
0.06
-0.23
0.18
0.17
18 Gender
214
0.66
0.48
0.10
0.08
0.10
-0.04
0.06
19 ACT
163
27.53
4.93
-0.05
-0.03
-0.07
0.04
0.05
20 Work Experience
213
11.04
9.19
0.06
-0.29
-0.24
-0.19
0.18
21 Tenure
204
3.65
3.23
-0.03
-0.01
-0.01
0.10
-0.06
22 Company Size
197
4387.88
14500.40
0.03
-0.03
0.00
-0.01
0.04
23 Ethics Training Hours
206
10.68
16.39
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.00
0.00
Ethics Training
24 Experience
214
0.59
0.49
0.07
0.11
-0.06
0.00
0.15
25 Race
214
1.15
1.26
0.09
-0.04
0.25
0.18
-0.16
26 Religion
214
4.36
3.00
-0.03
0.01
-0.03
-0.11
0.00
27 Industry
214
7.18
2.79
-0.11
-0.01
0.00
-0.19
-0.16
28 Education
214
3.69
1.42
0.02
0.05
0.11
0.02
0.05
29 Current Employment
214
0.93
0.25
-0.04
0.00
-0.03
0.01
0.02
30 Full/Part-time
214
1.64
59.00
-0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.07
31 Marital Status
214
1.10
1.29
-0.12
0.07
0.04
-0.14
-0.17
*Correlation between Test and Practice Blocks; Italicized - p ≤ .10; Bold and Italicized - p ≤ .05; Bold – p ≤ .01.; Alphas displayed on the diagonal.
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6

7

0.95
0.15
0.19

* 0.39
0.21

0.07
0.10
0.04
0.16
-0.14
0.18
0.20
0.05
0.09
0.10
0.08
0.15
-0.04
0.00
0.00

0.19
0.08
0.01
0.17
-0.11
0.24
0.26
0.05
0.07
-0.07
0.08
0.13
-0.04
-0.04
-0.06

-0.13
-0.14
0.04
0.08
0.01
-0.05
-0.07
-0.01

-0.10
-0.19
0.12
0.13
-0.06
0.02
0.02
-0.04

Table 6, Continued
Correlation Matrix
8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

8
0.83
9
0.09
0.75
10
0.05
0.69
0.63
11
-0.05
0.76
0.22
0.38
12
0.78
0.14
0.48
0.54
0.42
13
-0.11
0.82
-0.37
-0.58
-0.54
-0.65
14
0.72
0.26
0.30
0.37
0.37
0.43
-0.36
15
0.77
0.16
0.49
0.43
0.35
0.64
-0.65
0.42
16
-0.03
0.13
0.74
0.36
0.39
0.24
0.44
-0.49
0.43
17
0.10
0.00
-0.14
0.13
0.08
1.00
0.21
0.29
0.29
0.23
18
-0.13
-0.10
0.04
-0.01
-0.06
0.07
0.03
-0.08
0.04
-0.18
19
0.04
0.05
0.12
-0.09
-0.07
0.09
0.01
-0.06
-0.12
0.00
20
0.14
-0.01
-0.13
0.09
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.17
0.21
0.89
21
-0.05
0.11
0.07
0.07
-0.05
0.07
0.10
0.13
0.17
0.56
22
0.01
0.05
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.00
-0.03
-0.09
-0.09
0.00
23
0.08
0.11
0.04
0.06
0.05
0.00
-0.01
0.04
0.15
-0.15
24
0.01
-0.02
-0.08
0.08
-0.04
-0.01
-0.06
-0.05
-0.03
0.02
25
-0.11
-0.12
0.03
0.11
0.00
-0.31
-0.18
-0.15
-0.16
-0.16
26
0.11
-0.04
0.01
-0.12
-0.03
0.06
-0.06
-0.08
0.02
0.16
27
0.13
0.07
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.07
0.03
0.07
0.18
0.17
28
-0.08
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.06
0.03
0.19
29
0.02
-0.03
-0.10
0.01
0.03
0.02
-0.02
0.03
0.09
0.06
30
-0.06
0.05
-0.08
-0.05
0.04
0.02
-0.05
0.00
0.10
0.19
31
0.07
0.09
0.09
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.21
-0.16
0.16
0.38
*Correlation between Test and Practice Blocks; Italicized - p ≤ .10; Bold and Italicized - p ≤ .05; Bold – p ≤ .01.; Alphas displayed on the diagonal.
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18

1.00
-0.12
-0.11
-0.05
0.11
0.08
0.03
0.00
-0.05
-0.21
0.08
-0.03
0.09
-0.11

19

1.00
-0.02
-0.15
0.15
-0.07
-0.01
-0.13
-0.06
0.05
0.03
-0.04
0.03
-0.05

Table 6, Continued
Correlation Matrix
20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

20
1.00
21
1.00
0.47
22
0.03
0.02
1.00
23
0.04
-0.03
0.13
1.00
24
-0.07
0.01
0.13
1.00
0.55
25
0.00
0.06
0.02
0.06
1.00
-0.28
26
0.00
0.07
-0.11
-0.09
0.00
1.00
-0.15
27
0.10
-0.10
-0.08
0.02
-0.10
-0.12
0.10
1.00
28
0.01
-0.10
-0.07
-0.03
1.00
0.16
0.26
0.29
0.23
29
0.05
0.12
0.07
0.01
-0.07
-0.05
-0.09
1.00
-0.23
-0.26
30
0.07
0.04
-0.11
0.10
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.27
-0.31
0.64
31
-0.02
0.01
-0.04
-0.03
0.09
-0.01
-0.02
0.35
0.23
-0.16
*Correlation between Test and Practice Blocks; Italicized - p ≤ .10; Bold and Italicized - p ≤ .05; Bold – p ≤ .01.; Alphas displayed on the diagonal.
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30

1.00
0.00

31

1.00

The P-score and IAT-M are both individual-level variables that assess moral reasoning. The Pscore represents a respondents’ level of moral reasoning at the principled level, as measured by
the DIT. The IAT-M represents a respondent’s implicit associations of their moral self-concept.
Given the similarities, I expected these indexes to be correlated with these variables but not
strongly, given their differences (i.e., different cognitive processes).
Coherence. As expected, coherence was positively correlated with both the IAT-M (r =
.16) and the P-score (r = .31), suggesting that more coherent cognitive structures were associated
with a greater likelihood that participants would exhibit implicit moral self-concepts and higher
levels of principled reasoning (P-score). In addition, coherence and similarity were correlated (r
= .34) such that more coherent cognitive structures were associated with a greater likelihood of
being similar to referent experts’ cognitive structures.
Similarity. Also as expected, similarity was positively related to the IAT-M (r = .15) and
the P-score (r = .19).
Summary. Overall, the two indexes are similar to existing constructs that should be
related to the ethical decision-making process but are distinct enough as to be measuring
different constructs.
Divergent validity. To ensure construct validity, it was also important to distinguish a
new construct from other variables that it should not be related to. As such, I assessed
relationships between the BECS indexes (coherence and similarity) and various demographic
variables, social desirability, personality, and cognitive ability.
Coherence. As expected, coherence was unrelated to extraversion, gender, cognitive
ability, tenure, company size, religion, industry, education, current employment status, full/parttime status, and marital status. Surprisingly, and in contradiction with the results of the pilot
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study, coherence was correlated with impression management (r = .27) and self-deception (r =
.23). In addition, there were significant correlations with four of the Big 5 variables
(conscientiousness r = .39; neuroticism r = -.27; agreeableness r = .33; openness r = .27). This
also was an unexpected finding. Finally, there was a small correlation between race and
coherence (r = -.18). Whereas this was unexpected, this finding is likely due to the small number
of participants in some subgroups whose coherence scores were three times the overall average
(e.g., Hispanic N = 3; coherence = 0.60). Future research should investigate this issue to
determine whether there are actually sub-group differences or whether this is due to sampling
bias.
Similarity. As was the case with coherence, similarity was unrelated to extraversion,
gender, cognitive ability, tenure, company size, religion, industry, education, current
employment status, full/part-time status, and marital status. In addition, there were significant
correlations with four of the Big 5 variables (conscientiousness r = .16; neuroticism r = -.14;
agreeableness r = .20; openness r = .18). Also, there was a small correlation between similarity
and race (r = -.14). Unlike the results for coherence, similarity was unrelated to impression
management and self-deception.
Summary. Overall, BECS was not biased by industry, company size or gender in
addition to many other demographic variables. Also, cognitive ability did not predict
respondents’ level of ethical development. Future research would need to investigate whether
the race-BECS relationship can be replicated and why personality is related to schemas about
business ethics. In addition, whereas coherence was moderately correlated with impression
management and self-deception, the similarity index was not.
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Criterion-related validity. It also was important to test whether the newly created
measure predicts expected outcomes. To ascertain the amount of criterion-related validity
displayed by the BECS, I correlated the two BECS indexes with the three measurements of
CWBs as well as job satisfaction.
Coherence. Coherence was significantly correlated with the three CWB outcomes
(CWBI r = -.33; CWBO r = -.30; CWB intentions r = -.18) as well as job satisfaction (r = .17).
Thus, the more coherent a participant’s cognitive structure was, the less likely a participant was
to engage in or intend to engage in CWBs. Also, the more consistent a participant’s knowledge
structure was, the more satisfied that participant tended to be with his/her job.
Similarity. Similarity was significantly correlated with CWBI (r = -.16) but not CWBO,
CWB intentions, or job satisfaction. Thus, the more coherent a participants’ cognitive structure
was, the less likely a participants was to engage in CWBs towards individuals.
Summary. Overall, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the BECS has criterionrelated validity when using contextual performance and job attitudes as the criteria.
Antecedents of ethical schemas. Other factors are likely to contribute to the
development and structure of a person’s ethical schema. Thus, it was important to assess
potential antecedents of coherence and referent similarity. To this end, I correlated ethical work
climates, work experience, age, and ethics training experience with the two BECS indexes.
Coherence. Coherence was positively correlated with ethical work climates (r = .26),
work experience (r = .18), and age (r = .17), but uncorrelated with ethics training experience.
Thus, participants who perceived their work climate as being more ethical tended to have more
coherent schemas about business ethics. In addition, more coherent schemas correlated with
greater amounts of work experience, which also was reflected in the correlation between
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coherence and age. Unexpectedly, coherence was unrelated to ethics training experience. This
might be due to the fact that participants self-reported their amounts of training experience,
which could reflect memory deficits.
Similarity. Similarity was positively correlated with work experience (r = .15) but
uncorrelated with age, ethical work climate, and ethics training experience. Thus, the more work
experience that participants had, the more likely that their cognitive structures approximated the
referent experts’ structure. This evidence lends credence to the notion that the BECS captures
work-related ethical knowledge. Employees understand business ethics concepts with more
practice and experience dealing with or seeing ethical issues in organizations. Work experience
might not have been related to a generic ethics measure.
General summary of the BECS. Overall, there was evidence that the BECS indexes
were reliable and valid.
IAT Validity
Prior to testing my hypotheses, I first needed to examine evidence of reliability of the
IAT-M, to examine evidence of convergent, divergent, and criterion-related validity, and to
investigate antecedents of the IAT-M.
Descriptives and reliability. The average IAT score (M = .15, SD = .36) was in the
positive direction (i.e., individuals were more likely to associate moral aspects as opposed to
immoral aspects to themselves at the implicit level). In addition, I correlated the first test and
practice blocks as a measure of reliability and observed a positive correlation (r = .39).
Convergent validity. To ensure that the measure is assessing its intended construct, it
was important to correlate the new measure with existing measures that relate to but are distinct
from the newly created measure. Therefore, I expected the IAT-M to correlate positively with
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the three other individual moral reasoning variables (i.e., P-score, coherence, and similarity) and
found significant relationships with all three variables (r’s = .21, .16, .15, respectively). Thus,
there was a significant relationship between variables that were expected to correlate, but the
correlations were small enough to suggest that the IAT-M, P-score, coherence, and similarity
were measuring different constructs. This provided evidence that the IAT-M was measuring
some aspect of moral reasoning at the individual level.
Divergent validity. Also, I expected the IAT-M to diverge from unrelated variables. To
this end, I assessed the relationships between the IAT-M and various demographic variables,
social desirability, personality, and cognitive ability. As expected, IAT-M was uncorrelated with
extraversion, neuroticism, self-deception, gender, cognitive ability, tenure, company size,
religion, industry, education, current employment status, full/part-time status, and marital status.
Unexpectedly, IAT-M was negatively correlated with race (r = -.19) and positively correlated
with impression management (r = .19), conscientiousness (r = .17), agreeableness (r = .26), and
openness (r = .24). The relationship between IAT-M and race likely reflected the same issue as
in the BECS measure.
Criterion-related validity. I also wanted to ensure that the IAT-M predicted related
outcomes. Fortunately, the IAT-M was significantly related to all CWBs (CWBI r = -.29;
CWBO r = -.24; CWB intentions r = -.15) but unrelated to job satisfaction. Thus, participants
were less likely to engage in or intend to engage in CWBs when they associated moral aspects to
themselves at the implicit level than when they associated immoral concepts to themselves at the
implicit level.
Antecedents of implicit moral concepts. IAT-M was uncorrelated with ethical work
climates, age, work experience, or ethics training experience. The lack of relationships may be
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due to the generic vs. specific nature of the assessments. The IAT-M is generic whereas the
latter variables are specific to business contexts. Contextualizing the IAT-M may increase the
size of the correlations.
Tests of Hypotheses
I predicted that the BECS would explain unique, incremental variance in CWBs
(Hypothesis 1), controlling for the DIT (i.e., P-score). Results of this test can be found in Tables
7 and 8. I ran three separate hierarchical regression analyses (each analysis with three steps) for
each CWB outcome. Table 7 displays the results for CWBI. For the first step, I entered sample,
cultural dimensions, impression management, and self-deception into the regression equation.
Of these, only impression management was significant. In the second step, I entered P-score,
which did not add any statistically meaningful variance to the equation. Finally, in Step 3, I
added coherence and similarity, which accounted for an additional 2.5% of variance in CWBI.
The coherence effect was significant, but the similarity effect was not.
For CWBO (Table 8), sample and cultural dimensions were not entered into the
regression equation (see ANCOVA analyses in Table 3). Therefore, Step 1 included impression
management and self-deception, which resulted in significant negative associations with CWBO.
In Step 2, I added P-score which accounted for 1.3% incremental variance (p = .061). In Step 3,
adding coherence and similarity accounted for 2.1% incremental variance in CWBO. However,
only coherence was significantly related to CWBO. For both behavioral indicators, coherence
predicted CWBs, controlling for sample, culture, social desirability, and explicit moral
reasoning.
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For CWB intentions, I conducted the same hierarchical regression analysis as the CWBO
analysis. Only impression management significantly predicted CWB intentions, controlling for
self-deception, explicit moral reasoning, and ethical cognitive structures.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. Coherence explained unique,
incremental variance in CWBI and CWBO.
In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that implicit levels of moral reasoning would predict CWBI,
controlling for explicit moral reasoning. To test this, I simply added one step to the regression
analysis displayed in Table 7, i.e., adding IAT-M to the regression equation in Step 4. The IATM explained an additional 2.2% of the variance in CWBI, controlling for P-score, coherence,
similarity, sample, culture, and social desirability. In addition, coherence accounted for
significant variance in CWBI in the presence of IAT-M whereas P-score was unrelated to CWBI.
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was fully supported. Both coherence and the IAT-M explained variance
in CWBI, controlling for explicit moral reasoning, i.e., P-score.
In Hypothesis 3, I posited that explicit levels of moral reasoning would predict CWBO,
controlling for implicit moral reasoning. For this analysis, I added P-score in the last step (Step
4), with social desirability (i.e., impression management, self-deception) entered in the first step,
coherence and similarity in the second step, and IAT-M in the third step. Results of this analysis
can be found in Table 9. The results suggested that P-score did not account for any significant
incremental variance in CWBO. Coherence and IAT-M were significant predictors and
accounted for an additional 3% and 2% variance in CWBO, respectively. Therefore, Hypothesis
3 was not supported. I found no evidence that explicit moral reasoning explained variance in
CWBO, controlling for implicit moral reasoning.
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The purpose behind Research Question 1 was to assess the relative impact that contextual
factors (ethical work climate) had on CWBs, controlling for individual-level factors (IAT-M, Pscore, and BECS). To assess this relationship, I regressed CWBs on the individual level
variables first and then on ethical work climate in the second step of a hierarchical regression
equation. These results can be found in Tables 10 through 12. Results suggested that ethical
work climate did not account for any significant incremental variance in CWBs, controlling for
individual-level variables.
Finally, in Hypothesis 4 I predicted that ethical work climate would moderate the moral
reasoning-CWB relationship. To test for this relationship, I regressed each CWB measure on
control variables in the first step, ethical work climate and P-score in the second step, and the
interaction between ethical work climate and P-score in the final step. I mean-centered both
ethical work climates and P-score and then combined them to create an interaction term. Meancentering helps reduce multicollinearity between the main effects and the interaction term.
The results for these tests can be found in Tables 13 and 14. None of the interaction
terms were statistically significant. The data in this study failed to indicate that ethical work
climates interacted with P-scores in influencing CWBs.
Even though the focus of the Hypothesis 4 was on explicit, general moral reasoning, i.e.,
with P-scores, I conducted post hoc regression analyses with the other three individual moral
reasoning variables (i.e., IAT-M, coherence, and similarity). I regressed each CWB measure on
control variables in the first step, ethical work climate and one of the other three moral reasoning
variables in the second step, and the interaction between ethical work climate and that moral
reasoning variable in the final step. I found no evidence of significant interactions. Thus, based
on this aggregated evidence, Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
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However, it was noteworthy that ethical work climates explained unique variance in
CWBs when only one of the individual moral reasoning variables was included in the regression
equation. This may lend some insight into Research Question 1 in that ethical work climates
may explain variance in CWBs not accounted for by individual moral reasoning. Nonetheless,
individual moral reasoning still explained some variance in CWBs; therefore, both variables are
likely to influence individuals’ propensity to engage in CWBs. When accounting for IAT-M,
ethical work climate marginally predicted CWBO (β = -.12, t = -1.882, p = .061) and CWBI (β =
-.12, t = -1.930, p = .055). When accounting for P-score, ethical work climate predicted both
CWBO (β = -.14, t = -2.217, p = .028) and CWBI (β = -.15, t = -2.369, p = .019). When
accounting for coherence, ethical work climate marginally predicted CWBO (β = -.11, t = -1.699,
p = .091) and CWBI (β = -.12, t = -1.807, p = .072). When accounting for similarity, ethical
work climate accounted for both CWBO (β = -.13, t = -2.094, p = .037) and CWBI (β = -.14, t =
-2.249, p = .026). Not surprisingly, IAT-M and coherence were stronger predictors of CWBI and
CWBO than P-score and similarity in explaining unique variance when accounting for an
individual’s ethical work climate.
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Table 7
BECS Effects on CWBI, Controlling for DIT – Hypothesis 1

Model

1

2

3

F

11.262

10.295

14.101

p

.000

.000

.000

R2

ΔR2

.281

.281

.291

.316

β

t

p

Sample

-.12

- 1.884

.061

Power Distance

.53

1.835

.068

Uncertainty Avoid

-.00

- 0.027

.978

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.01

- 0.092

.926

Individualism

.31

1.111

.268

Impression MGT

-.37

-4.806

.000

Self-Deception

-.11

-1.484

.139

Sample

-.12

- 2.145

.033

Power Distance

.42

- 1.420

.157

Uncertainty Avoid

.01

0.089

.929

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.01

- 0.118

.906

Individualism

.24

0.836

.404

Impression MGT

-.36

-4.700

.000

Self-Deception

-.12

-1.502

.135

Pscore

-.11

-1.679

.095

Sample

-.13

-2.145

.033

Variable

.010

.025
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4

9.290

.000

.344

.022
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Power Distance

.38

1.286

.200

Uncertainty Avoid

-.03

-0.224

.823

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.01

-0.119

.905

Individualism

.23

0.818

.415

Impression MGT

-.33

-4.331

.000

Self-Deception

-.09

-1.234

.219

Pscore

-.06

-0.874

.383

Coherence

-.16

-2.324

.021

Similarity

-.05

-0.733

.465

Sample

-.11

-1.823

.070

Power Distance

.37

1.285

.200

Uncertainty Avoid

-.04

-0.352

.725

UncertAvoid*Coh

.00

0.027

.978

Individualism

.23

0.846

.399

Impression MGT

-.31

-4.008

.000

Self-Deception

-.11

-1.471

.143

Pscore

-.04

-0.522

.602

Coherence

-.14

-2.059

.041

Similarity

-.04

-0.700

.485

IAT
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-.16

-2.566

.011

Table 8
BECS Effects on CWBO and CWB Intentions, Controlling for DIT – Hypothesis 1

Model

F

p

R2

ΔR2

β

t

p

Impression MGT

-.36

-4.581

.000

Self-Deception

-.18

-2.358

.019

Impression MGT

-.35

-4.485

.000

Self-Deception

-.18

-2.382

.018

Pscore

-.11

-1.887

.061

Impression MGT

-.32

-4.126

.000

Self-Deception

-.17

-2.156

.032

Pscore

-.07

-1.044

.298

Coherence

-.15

-2.154

.032

Similarity

-.03

-0.454

.650

Variable

CWBO

1

2

3

33.021

23.470

15.523

.000

.000

.000

.240

.253

.274

.240

.013

.021

CWB Intentions

76

1

2

34.879

23.144

.000

.000

.250

.250

.250
Impression MGT

-.41

-5.287

.000

Self-Deception

-.13

-1.723

.086

Impression MGT

-.41

-5.269

.000

Self-Deception

-.13

-1.719

.087

.00

0.069

.945

Impression MGT

-.40

-5.101

.000

Self-Deception

-.13

-1.611

.109

Pscore

.02

0.345

.730

Coherence

-.04

-0.546

.585

Similarity

-.04

-0.568

.571

.000

Pscore
3

13.985

.000

.253

.003
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Table 9
DIT Effects on CWBO, Controlling for BECS and IAT-M – Hypothesis 3

Model

F

p

R2

ΔR2

1

31.687

.000

.236

.236

2

3

4

18.392

16.150

13.520

.000

.000

.000

.266

.286

.288

Variable

β

t

p

Impression MGT

-.36

-4.618

.000

Self-Deception

-.18

-2.261

.025

Impression MGT

-.33

-4.178

.000

Self-Deception

-.16

-2.026

.044

Coherence

-.17

-2.480

.014

Similarity

-.03

-0.530

.597

Impression MGT

-.29

-4.126

.000

Self-Deception

-.17

-2.156

.032

Coherence

-.15

-2.154

.032

Similarity

-.02

-0.454

.650

IAT-M

-.15

-2.353

.020

ImpressionMGT

-.30

-3.788

.000

Self-Deception

-.17

-2.200

.029

Coherence

-.14

-2.058

.041

.030

.020

.002
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Similarity

-.01

-0.196

.845

IAT-M

-.14

-2.209

.028

Pscore

-.05

-0.742

.459

Table 10
Ethical Work Climate Effects on CWBI, Controlling for Individual Moral Reasoning - Research Question 1

Model

1

2

F

p

9.290

.000

8.783

.000

R2

ΔR2

.344

.344

.352

Variable

β

t

p

Sample

-.11

-1.823

.070

Power Distance

.37

1.285

.200

Uncertainty Avoidance

-.04

-0.352

.725

UncertainAvoid*Coh

.00

0.027

.978

Individualism

.23

0.846

.399

ImpressionMGT

-.31

-4.008

.000

Self-Deception

-.11

-1.471

.143

Coherence

-.14

-2.059

.041

Similarity

-.04

-0.700

.485

IAT-M

-.16

-2.566

.011

Pscore

-.04

-0.522

.602

Sample

-.13

-2.050

.042

Power Distance

.42

1.460

.146

Uncertainty Avoidance

-.04

-0.329

.742

UncertainAvoid*Coh

.01

0.053

.958

Individualism

.28

1.018

.310

.008
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ImpressionMGT

-.30

-3.912

.000

Self-Deception

-.09

-1.159

.248

Coherence

-.12

-1.692

.092

Similarity

-.04

-0.678

.498

IAT-M

-.15

-2.399

.017

Pscore

-.05

-0.734

.464

Ethical Work Climate

-.11

-1.563

.120

Table 11
Ethical Work Climate Effects on CWBO, Controlling for Individual Moral Reasoning – Research Question 1

Model

1

2

F

p

13.520

.000

12.052

.000

R2

ΔR2

Variable

β

t

.288

.288

ImpressionMGT

-.30

-3.788

.000

Self-Deception

-.17

-2.200

.029

Coherence

-.14

-2.058

.041

Similarity

-.01

-0.196

.845

IAT-M

-.14

-2.209

.028

Pscore

-.05

-0.742

.459

ImpressionMGT

-.29

-3.677

.000

Self-Deception

-.15

-1.885

.061

Coherence

-.12

-1.688

.093

Similarity

-.01

-0.176

.860

IAT-M

-.13

-2.067

.040

Pscore

-.07

-1.026

.306

Ethical Work Climate

-.11

-1.612

.109

.297

p

.009
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Table 12
Ethical Work Climate Effects on CWB Intentions, Controlling for Individual Moral Reasoning – Research Question 1

Model

1

2

F

11.459

10.179

p

R2

ΔR2

Variable

β

t

.000

.255

.255

ImpressionMGT

-.39

-4.946

.000

Self-Deception

-.12

-1.595

.112

Coherence

-.03

-0.451

.653

Similarity

-.03

-0.488

.626

IAT-M

-.06

-0.945

.346

Pscore

.03

0.431

.667

ImpressionMGT

-.39

-4.842

.000

Self-Deception

-.10

-1.314

.190

Coherence

-.01

-0.141

.888

Similarity

-.03

-0.471

.638

IAT-M

-.05

-0.815

.416

Pscore

-.01

0.160

.873

Ethical Work Climate

-.10

-1.455

.147

.000

.263

p

.008
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Table 13
Ethical Work Climate and DIT Interaction Effects on CWBI – Hypothesis 4

Model

1

2

F

p

R2

ΔR2

11.262

.000

.281

.281

10.063

.000

.312

β

t

p

Sample

-.12

- 1.884

.061

Power Distance

.53

1.835

.068

Uncertainty Avoid

-.00

- 0.027

.978

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.01

- 0.092

.926

Individualism

.31

1.111

.268

Impression MGT

-.37

-4.806

.000

Self-Deception

-.11

-1.484

.139

Sample

-.14

- 2.293

.023

Power Distance

.49

- 1.674

.096

Uncertainty Avoid

.01

0.054

.957

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.01

- 0.063

.950

Individualism

.31

1.106

.270

Impression MGT

-.34

-4.448

.000

Self-Deception

-.08

-1.001

.318

Pscore

-.12

-1.852

.066

Ethical Work Climate

-.16

-2.472

.014

Variable

.031
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3

9.071

.000

.313

.001
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Sample

-.14

-2.250

.026

Power Distance

.50

1.700

.091

Uncertainty Avoid

-.00

-0.013

.989

UncertAvoid*Coh

-.00

-0.028

.978

Individualism

.33

1.154

.250

Impression MGT

-.34

-4.486

.000

Self-Deception

-.07

-0.958

.339

Pscore

-.13

-1.892

.060

Ethical Work Climate

-.15

-2.369

.019

EthicalWorkClim*Pscore -.04

-0.641

.522

Table 14
Ethical Work Climate and DIT Interaction Effects on CWBO and CWB Intentions – Hypothesis 4

Model

F

p

R2

ΔR2

β

t

p

Impression MGT

-.35

-4.585

.000

Self-Deception

-.18

-2.367

.019

Impression MGT

-.32

-4.225

.000

Self-Deception

-.15

-1.912

.057

Pscore

-.13

-2.227

.027

Ethical Work Climate

-.15

-2.443

.015

Impression MGT

-.34

-4.400

.000

Self-Deception

-.14

-1.822

.070

Pscore

-.14

-2.372

.019

Ethical Work Climate

-.14

-2.217

.028

Ethical Work Climate*Pscore

-.10

-1.683

.094

Impression MGT

-.41

-5.291

.000

Self-Deception

-.13

-1.732

.085

Impression MGT

-.39

-5.045

.000

Variable

CWBO

1

2

3

33.134

19.673

16.444

.000

.000

.000

.240

.274

.284

.240

.035

.010

CWB Intentions
1

2

34.992

18.504

.000

.000

.250

.262

.250

.012
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3

15.087

.000

.267

.005

Self-Deception

-.11

-1.350

.178

Pscore

-.01

-0.204

.838

Ethical Work Climate

-.12

-1.877

.062

Impression MGT

-.40

-5.143

.000

Self-Deception

-.10

-1.285

.200

Pscore

-.02

-0.301

.764

Ethical Work Climate

-.11

-1.716

.088

Ethical Work Climate*Pscore

-.07

-1.144

.254
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Discussion
There were four purposes for conducting this study. One, there was a need in the
literature to develop a direct assessment of individual ethical schemas and assess its unique
impact on CWBs, controlling for the DIT. Two, I intended to show that explicit and implicit
ethical antecedents uniquely predict CWBs, depending on CWB source (i.e., interpersonal and
organizational). Third, I wished to investigate the impact that contextual factors (i.e., ethical
work climate) had on CWBs, controlling for individual-level factors (i.e., IAT-M, DIT, BECS).
Fourth, I merged the ethics and CWB literature by investigating the effects of ethical cognitive
antecedents on CWBs.
My research contributes to our understanding of business ethics in three ways. One, I
demonstrated that it was possible to develop a direct assessment of an individual’s ethical
schema by mapping his/her business ethics cognitive structure using PathFinder algorithms.
Results supported adequate convergent, divergent, and criterion-related validity for the BECS
measure. In addition, the BECS measure accounted for unique variance in CWBs while
controlling for the DIT. In fact, the DIT did not predict CWBs when the BECS measure
(specifically the coherence index) was present in the model. This suggests that evaluating ethics
training using the DIT may under-predict an individual’s ability to operate ethically within
organizational spheres. The BECS provides organizational practitioners and researchers with a
more direct, context-specific assessment of an individual’s schema about business ethics, an
assessment that is rooted in organizational life.
A second contribution is that, whereas I did not observe differential effects of implicit
and explicit antecedents on CWBI and CWBO, respectively, there seemed to be greater impact
of implicit antecedents on CWBs (interpersonal and organizational) than explicit antecedents.
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Specifically, the IAT-M and the BECS coherence index were predictors of both behavioral
criteria whereas the DIT was not predictive of either CWB (individual or organizational) when
controlling for all other variables, despite the negative bivariate correlation between the DIT and
CWBs. This finding suggests that ethical and counterproductive work behavior may be more
strongly determined by intuitions, emotions, and automatic processes than rational, cognitive
processes. If true, this would have far-reaching implications for facets of human resource
functioning such as training, selection, and organizational culture. Future research would need to
replicate these effects to determine the overall, relative contribution of each process.
A third contribution of my research is that, whereas ethical work climates did not have a
unique contribution to the commission of CWBs when accounting for all individual-level
variables, ethical work climates did account for unique variance in CWBs when only one
individual-level variable was included in the analysis. This finding depended on the particular
individual-level variable. For instance, ethical work climates accounted for unique variance in
CWBO and CWBI when the DIT and similarity were the individual-level variables. Ethical
work climate effects on CWBs were weaker when accounting for IAT-M and coherence. Thus,
ethical work climates, whereas not as strong of a predictor as some individual-level variables
given the inconsistent relationship patterns, still contributed some unique variance in explaining
the behavior of individuals.
Theoretical Implications
Overall, the findings have interesting implications for theory and practice in the area of
business ethics. One implication relates to the intuitive nature of ethical decisions and behavior.
That is, the results provided initial evidence that implicit processes and cognitive schemas were
more predictive of CWBs than rationalization processes. My results are consistent with Haidt’s
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(2001) social intuitionist model and the neurocognitive model of ethical decision-making
(Reynolds, 2006; Reynolds, et al., 2010).
Regarding the neurocognitive model, Reynolds (2006) proposed that if an individual
could structure ambiguous information into meaningful patterns, that particular individual would
be more likely to behave ethically. This is, in fact, what I found. The coherence index of the
BECS predicted CWBs, controlling for other variables. The coherence index measured the
extent to which individuals structured information within a given domain consistently. In
general, schemas drive human perception, memory, and recall (Baddeley, 1990; Bartlett, 1932;
Rumelhart & Norman, 1985). By extension, structuring ethical knowledge into meaningful
patterns increases the odds that individuals will be able to recognize morally ambiguous
information and enact the moral judgment process. Individuals with inconsistent or
incomprehensible ethical knowledge patterns would have difficulty understanding when or
where an ethical situation may arise and how to rectify the situation. This may cause either
deliberate or inadvertent unethical behavior as a result of lacking a coherent conception of ethics.
Also, the more consistent the individual’s knowledge structure, the greater likelihood that an
individual’s reflexive-judgment system will be able to identify the correct prototype (i.e.,
schema) to apply to a particular situation and cause ethical actions.
In addition to the contribution that this study had toward the neurocognitive model of
ethical decision-making, there are important theoretical implications for the social intuitionist
model as well. The IAT-M in particular was predictive even when accounting for the BECS and
P-score. This finding lends support for (1) using the implicit association test as a technique for
assessing the implicit processes inherent in the ethical decision-making process and (2)
investigating the automatic, effortless internalizations of how individuals morally think about
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themselves and the impact of these internalizations on organizational behavior. Regarding the
first point, the implicit association test has been widely used in attitude research and other
domains for quite some time (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Normally, the
dual-target task has been used. However, I used the single-target task in this study because of
the ambiguity and inherent variability caused by the use of the “other” target category. Use of
the single-target category did not seem to decrease the predictiveness of the IAT.
Regarding the second point, how an individual implicitly associated aspects of morality
to his/her self-concept seemed to offer explanatory power above explicit indicators of moral
development. What was more surprising was that the IAT-M predicted so well given that it was
as generic as the DIT (i.e., non-work specific). The BECS measure (in particular the coherence
index) also was predictive even though it was context-specific and more implicit than the DIT.
Altogether, this would suggest that it might be the implicit nature of these individual-level
variables (IAT-M and BECS) that accounts for the majority of the predictive validity rather than
the context-specificity of the measure. Because it was beyond the scope of the current study to
systematically examine this issue, future research is needed to disentangle the effects of process
(i.e., explicit versus implicit) and context-specificity (general versus specific) to determine the
relative importance of these factors in predicting ethical and counterproductive work behavior.
The evidence as it relates to the first theoretical implication also adds credence to
criticisms of the DIT measure, which leads me to the second theoretical implication. That is,
researchers should measure ethical schemas directly rather than indirectly. Rest (1979)
predicated the development of the DIT on the assumption that moral dilemma vignettes activate
moral schemas that individuals use to form decisions. Thus, an individual’s ratings and rankings
of issues reflect the activated moral schemas. However, researchers have techniques that are
91

valid means of assessing schemas and are more direct (e.g., concept mapping, structural
assessment; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011). In other words, researchers, practitioners, and
consumers of ethics research do not have to make inferential leaps of faith when assessing
schemas via structural assessment. Structural assessments reflect an individual’s knowledge
constructions whereas an individual’s ratings of issues related to a decision can reflect
justification for a decision-making process that may or may not have taken place.
Implicit measures (e.g., IAT-M, BECS) were stronger predictors than explicit measures
(e.g., DIT). This result was consistent with prior research on this topic (Marquardt, 2010;
Reynolds, et al., 2010). By implication, the DIT may be an inadequate measure for testing moral
schemas given its reliance on post-decision rationalization (Hannah, et al., 2011). That is, due to
the generic nature of the measure, the DIT may not reflect ethical schemas adequately, especially
ethical schemas in organizational contexts. This criticism is predicated on Haidt’s (2001) socialintuitionist model. Haidt (2001) insisted that the “dog does not wag the tail” when it comes to
moral decision-making. In other words, post-hoc reasoning does not cause the decision. Rather,
individuals often form decisions outside of conscious, rational processes. The reasoning is a
result of forming a justification for actions that may or may not have occurred. Haidt (2001)
equated the moral reasoning process to humans acting as intuitive lawyers as opposed to rational
logicians or scientists. The goal of human reasoning is not to present the most irrefutable
evidence but to provide the illusion that the evidence is irrefutable through the use of metaphors
and visual illustrations. Thus, the DIT and associated measures provide a glimpse into how
humans present themselves to others rather than an accurate reflection of how humans actually
think about and structure ethical knowledge. In addition, most research on the DIT investigates
moral judgments as the outcome as opposed to effects on moral behavior (Hannah, et al., 2011).
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Thus, researchers using the DIT have contributed very little to understanding moral behavior,
which can and often does deviate from judgment processes. As Reynolds (2006) stated, “one
can think like Kant, but act like Machiavelli’s Prince” (p. 743).
The current study would suggest that relying on the DIT to assess moral development
may only aid in understanding a person’s rationalization process as it relates to moral judgments.
The DIT does not, however, provide evidence about how an individual’s context-specific schema
impacts actual behavior in the workplace. The current study provided evidence that future
researchers can, and should, measure ethical schemas directly in attempting to understand how
individuals think about and organize ethical knowledge and how that ethical knowledge impacts
ethical behavior.
Finally, the third theoretical implication relates to the merging of the ethics and CWB
research literatures. Prior research has suggested that the two literatures have developed
relatively independently (Kish-Gephart, et al., 2010). In particular, the foci of antecedents
differed depending on the literature. For instance, very little research in the CWB literature has
discussed or advocated the use of cognitive antecedents whereas the ethics literature (KishGephart, et al., 2010) exclusively has examined cognitive aspects such as cognitive moral
development. The CWB literature has concentrated on attitudinal measures such as job
satisfaction or personality measures such as the Big 5 (Berry, Ones, & Sackett, 2007). Thus, the
current study contributed to the theory of counterproductive work behavior by accounting for
ethical cognitive structures (i.e., BECS), cognitive moral development (i.e., DIT), and implicit
moral self-concepts (i.e., IAT-M) as influences on whether an individual engages in
counterproductive work behaviors.
Practical Implications
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In addition to implications for theory, my results also have practical implications for
training, selection, and organizational culture/climate. For example, the BECS measure has the
potential to benefit the design and evaluation of ethics-based training. I designed the BECS
measure to be an evaluation tool rooted in knowledge and how individuals structure ethical
knowledge. One study using the structural assessment technique has used the technique as an
evaluation tool and a training tool in and of itself. For instance, Trumpower and Sarwar (2010)
assessed a group of high school physics students using the structural assessment technique prior
to the course. Then, throughout the course, the teachers showed students their personal cognitive
structure as well as the referent other’s cognitive structure. Providing feedback on individual
cognitive structures provided students a pictorial understanding of their progress and where
students needed to be as far as understanding concept inter-relatedness within the domain of
physics. Trumpower and Sarwar (2010) observed that the students’ post-training cognitive
structures improved over pre-test levels after receiving feedback.
An implication for ethics training is that not only does the BECS measure serve as a more
powerful training evaluation tool than other existing measures (an end in itself) but that the
BECS measure also can serve a functional role during training by displaying ethical concept
understanding and where misconceptions may exist within the sphere of the business ethics
domain. Providing this feedback may be a cogent cue to trainees about how to conceptualize and
structure their understanding about business ethics concepts.
In addition, the effect of implicit processes on behavior as evidenced in the current study
suggests that ethics training design can be impacted in several other ways. Because intuitions
have a strong impact on CWBs, it would be wise to design ethics training to teach trainees to
recognize the signs and cues that define ethical situations as they relate to ethical decisions and
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actions because detection of signs and cues often is implicit. For instance, ethics trainers can
teach trainees to observe their initial thoughts and feelings when presented with a gift from a
vendor. Trainees can be taught to recognize these thoughts and feelings (e.g., concern, anxiety)
and engage in cognitive processes to relate these thoughts and feelings to possible consequences
gift acceptance may have on themselves and others. In addition, ethics trainers could introduce
game-based training as a possible means of embedding implicit cues in the training context (e.g.,
business simulation task replete with ethical scenarios akin to SIMS video game series).
A second practical implication involves the use of the BECS in a personnel selection
context. Integrity is a valued competency for most if not all positions in organizations. Selecting
on the basis of morality and ethics largely has focused on the development of integrity tests.
Integrity tests are predictive of job performance when coupled with cognitive ability (multiple R
= .65; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and exhibit near-zero subgroup differences (Finch, Edwards, &
Craig, 2009; Ployhart & Holtz, 2008). Researchers designed integrity tests to be assessed with
direct or indirect measures. Direct measurements of integrity often ask respondents to provide
admissions of theft, sabotage, laziness on the job, etc., whereas indirect measurements are more
personality-based (e.g., conscientiousness). Thus, the former may induce socially desirable
responses whereas the latter may still be faked, depending on the test-takers’ interpretations.
Regardless, integrity tests have predictive value (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Schmidt
& Hunter, 1998; Schmitt & Chan, 1998) and are the single best predictor when it comes to
maximizing the tradeoff between validity and adverse impact in a multiple stage battery (Finch et
al., 2009).
Despite this evidence, the results of my study suggest that some of the variance in
integrity is left unexplained because integrity tests (both overt and personality-based) likely
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reflect explicit rather than implicit aspects of integrity. Utilizing more intuitive or schema-based
tests may add to the predictive validity of integrity-based variables when predicting job
performance criteria (e.g., contextual performance).
Knowledge structures addressing business ethics, a likely malleable construct, could be
viewed in similar terms as a job knowledge test, which itself is malleable. Selection researchers
have wondered why knowledge structures and other knowledge elicitation techniques have
received little attention in the selection literature (Schmitt & Chan, 1998). Nevertheless, it is
likely that the BECS could be used in a selection context as an opportunity to “flag” potential
unwanted employees after they have passed several other stages of the selection battery. If there
are multiple candidates that are suitable for selection, the BECS could be one of many
subsequent tools to assess the viability of a candidate, particularly for positions that require
leadership and decision-making abilities.
A third practical implication reflects the ability of organizations to develop ethical
cultures and climates. The results of my study point to the fact that individuals utilize and are
more sensitive to implicit processes when behaving ethically or counterproductively in the
workplace. Therefore, implicit cues and messages that individuals perceive inform individuals
about acceptable behavior within organizations. For instance, in their infamously titled paper
“Goals Gone Wild,” Ordoñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, and Bazerman (2009) described the
maladaptive impact that overreliance on goal-setting can have on organizational behavior.
Specifically, they cited Sears, Roebuck and Co’s foray into goal-setting as one example where
goal-setting can “go wild.” Here, the company encouraged its auto-repair staff to meet its
specific, challenging goal of raising sales revenue to $147/hour. To meet this difficult goal, the
sales staff began overcharging for work and convincing customers to perform unnecessary car
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repairs. Similar cultural problems have pervaded more famously cited cases such as Enron,
Bank of America, Ford Motor Co. (i.e., Ford Pinto), etc. The implicit assumption underlying
these cases is that an aggressive, competitive environment can spawn unethical behavior. This
could occur despite organizational efforts to appeal to explicit aspects of persuasion such as
codes of conduct, ethical newsletters, mission statements, etc. The explicit components of an
ethical company must match its implicit components. In other words, an ethics officer can speak
and lecture ad nauseam about avoiding conflicts of interest and abiding by legal regulations, but
if the implicit cues that saturate the organization suggest that aggressive, competitive and resultsoriented business practices are rewarded, the explicit route of persuasion is futile.
How practitioners change culture may reflect their ability to leverage both the
implicitness of individual decision-making and the contextual factors of the situation. Luckily,
research has shown that implicit associations are susceptible to contextual factors (Allen,
Sherman, & Klauer, 2010; Shepherd, 2011). In addition, in their lab study on implicit moral
beliefs about business practices (i.e., “business is moral/immoral”), Reynolds et al. (2010) found
that implicit beliefs about business practices did not increase the probability of behaving
immorally. However, when a contextual cue was presented that manipulated the competitive vs.
value-laden nature of the organization, those who carried an implicit belief that business was
moral (i.e., an “anything goes” mentality) while given a competitive cue were 33 times more
likely to behave immorally (i.e., file a false insurance claim in a business simulation) than those
who held the same belief but were given a value cue (i.e., “we will always do what is right”).
There were no contextual cue differences for those who held the implicit belief that business was
immoral. It is noteworthy that explicit beliefs had no bearing on how individuals performed in
the lab-based simulation. Thus, if Reynolds et al. (2010) could find this effect in a low-stakes,
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artificial task, the differences are likely to be greater in real-world settings when the stakes are
higher and the consequences more personal.
Limitations
As with any scientific research study, there are potential limitations in this study. One
potential limitation is that all measures involved self-report. Some might argue that solely using
self-report as the method for data collection results in an upwardly biased estimate of the
relationships between constructs due common method variance (e.g., see Chan, 2009, for a
discussion of this issue). In addition, the self-report method may be more susceptible to socially
desirable responding. These concerns may be valid, but there are four reasons why readers
should be less concerned with the results of this study based on this limitation. One, some of the
measures were task-based (i.e., IAT-M, BECS, and DIT) and were less susceptible to social
desirability than Likert-type scales (see Table 6 for correlations between these variables and
impression management and self-deception). Two, I controlled for socially desirable responding
in the analytical phase of hypothesis testing and found that even controlling for this nuisance
variable, the variables of interest still predicted relevant criteria. Three, self-reports of CWBs are
moderately to strongly correlated with other-reports of CWBs (Berry, Carpenter, & Barratt,
2012), and their nomological relationships do not differ appreciably depending on the sampling
method (Fox, Spector, Goh, & Bruursema, 2007). In fact, Berry et al. (2012) observed little to
zero incremental contribution in variance in common correlates after controlling for self-reported
CWBs. Finally, Chan (2009) recounted the various reasons why common method variance and
the shortcomings of self-report data may be more of a myth and urban legend than based in fact.
Therefore, correlating self-reported predictors with self-reported criteria may not be as
problematic as once thought.
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Another potential limitation relates to the generic vs. specific nature of the three main
variables of interest (i.e., BECS, IAT-M, and DIT). Specifically, the BECS reflects contextspecific aspects of organizational ethics whereas the IAT-M and DIT reflect general aspects of
morality. Additionally, these variables reflect different processes (i.e., explicit vs. implicit). The
question that results from this discussion is whether the observed differences reflect the
specificity of the measures or the type of processing. It could be the type of processing that
seemed to lead to the greatest impact on CWBs (i.e., IAT-M and BECS were more predictive
than the DIT) because they both reflect implicit processes rather than explicit and they differ
depending on the context-specificity. However, further research is needed to disentangle these
effects.
Future Research
My results suggest several avenues of future research. One, researchers need to conduct
further validation work on the BECS measure to examine its viability as an applied assessment
tool. In particular, there is a pressing need to assess test-retest reliability to ascertain the level of
stability of the measure over time. It is not expected to display very high test-retest reliability,
given its intended malleability. Cross-validating the BECS measure with additional samples is
likely to improve the credibility of the BECS as well. As a part of this cross-validation process,
it is important to use other methods of assessment when correlating the BECS with other
constructs. Thus, using objective data or reports from others may be a good way of displaying
additional validation support.
It also is vital that future researchers examine the significant, but small correlations that
the BECS exhibited with impression management and self-deception. It was an unexpected
finding, one that may be an artifact of the sample or is endemic of the measure. In addition,
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future researchers should obtain a large enough sample from different racial categories to
observe any sub-group differences that may exist. This study had too few Hispanics to
adequately test for subgroup differences. Of the racial subgroups where enough data was
collected, there were no subgroup differences (i.e., Whites, Blacks, and Asians). It also would be
interesting if future studies examined the face validity of this measure compared to other
measures. If the BECS exhibits higher levels of face validity among participants compared to
other measures, then participants would be more likely to “buy-in” to the BECS as an assessment
tool and potentially lead to greater likelihood of participation. To ensure that the BECS differs
from other, unrelated cognitive structures, future researchers should ensure that the business
ethics component of the BECS is what is driving the predictive validity of the BECS and not the
method itself. Finally, to examine the viability of the BECS as a training evaluation tool, future
researchers should employ the use of the BECS in a pre- and post-test format within an ethics
training seminar to assess its ability to detect change in ethical schema development.
Future researchers in ethics training, heeding the advice and implications of this study,
should seek implicit learning studies as guides for how to improve ethics training. Contextual
cuing is a technique that may be useful for improving the spatial components of training and
ecological environments within the realm of ethics training (Chun & Jiang, 1998). This could be
particularly useful for online ethics simulations. Implicit learning may be a useful route of ethics
training given that it requires less cognitive effort than the central routes of information
processing to acquire new information. Future research should explore these areas for possible
theoretical development.
Future researchers should examine the impact that contextual factors have on the ethical
decision-making and ethical behavior processes. The effect of ethical work climate on CWBs
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was less than expected in this study. Future research should look at other avenues of assessing
ethical work climates. Arnaud (2010) showed that the most commonly used measure, developed
by Victor and Cullen (1988), has a factor structure that changes from sample to sample. Arnaud
(2010) proposed a multi-dimensional scale based on Rest’s (1979) model of moral decisionmaking, but Arnaud’s measure has not yet been cross-validated. The current study utilized items
from both scales to create a single scale that measured ethical work climate on one continuum,
but this factor did not account for any unique variance in CWBs. Thus, self-report scales of
ethical work climates require improvement, especially given the anecdotal evidence pointing to
the impact that contextual factors have on ethical behavior.
An alternative means of assessing the ethical climate of organizations may be the use of
objective indicators of ethical organizations. For example, Kish-Gephart, et al. (2010) found that
codes of conduct, in and of themselves, did not predict ethical behavior. Rather, the enforcement
of these codes predicted whether an individual behaved ethically. Other researchers have
proposed other means of assessing contextual factors that impact ethical behavior, such as
normative structures, reinforcement, responsibility for consequences and external sanctions
(Treviño, 1986; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008).
Finally, future researchers can gauge the ethical work climate by employing implicit
association techniques. Prior research already has displayed that the IAT is malleable due to
environmental influences (Han, et al., 2010; Shepherd, 2011). Tailoring the IAT to reflect target
associations between the company and ethical/unethical categories may be a way of assessing the
true nature of company culture as processed and activated by the IAT.
Conclusion
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Business ethics plays an important part in the survival and success of a company. If it did
not, then Enron would still exist today. Ethical breaches can make or break a company, yet
decision-makers rarely discuss or process long-term costs of ethical breaches. Rather, short-term
gains are at the forefront of thought. Given the economic recession of the early 21st century, the
need to study business ethics is very clear and evident. The current study adds to the knowledge
base of business ethics scholars. Theoretically, the results of this study challenge the notion that
individuals address ethical dilemmas through logical, rational means of decision-making and
action. Rather, individuals rely on initial whims, assumptions, intuitions, and emotions to enact
behaviors. Practically-speaking, my study offers trainers and HR actors the ability to directly
assess how individuals perceive and structure ethical knowledge and information, which
ultimately drives how individuals behave within organizations. Together, these key findings can
help researchers and practitioners train and identify ethical actors who will take part in building a
cohesive, moral organization, the type of organization that is necessary to operate successfully in
a modern, dynamic, and global marketplace.
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Appendix A
Pilot Study
The purpose of the pilot study was to develop the BECS measure and assess relationships
between hypothesized predictors and criteria. Below, I describe participants and procedures for
data collection. Also, I discuss validation evidence for the IAT-M. In addition, I conducted
factor-analytic work on the ethical work climate measure. Then, I describe in detail the
development of the BECS measure. Finally, I briefly discuss preliminary tests of hypotheses
with the pilot data.
Participants
Participants for the pilot study were undergraduate students at a large, public university in
the Midwest. These undergraduate students were enrolled in introductory psychology courses
and participated in exchange for course credit. A total of 217 students signed up and participated
in the online study. I excluded those who did not provide demographic information, outliers, and
unemployed participants. Participants (N = 160) retained in my analyses possessed the following
characteristics: age (M = 20.01, SD = 3.15), gender (female = 64%, male = 36%), race (White =
58%, Black = 27%, Asian = 5%, Hispanic = 2%, Native American = 1%, Other = 8%), marital
status (single, never married = 85%, engaged = 7%, married = 4%, divorced = 1%, other = 3%),
religion (Protestant Christian = 27%, Roman Catholic = 8%, Evangelical Christian = 10%,
Muslim = 7%, Hindu = 1%, Buddhist = 1%, Agnostic = 7%, Atheist = 4%, Other = 35%), work
experience in years (M = 3.66, SD = 3.95), length of time with current employer in years (M =
1.65, SD = 1.56), company size in terms of number of employees (M = 11305.88, SD =
51612.53), industry (education = 9%, manufacturing = 4%, healthcare = 11%, retail = 26%,
professional services = 8%, telecom = 3%, agriculture = 3%, other = 36%), annual salary (M =
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$8,188.18, SD = $8,346.99), ethics training experience (Yes = 24%, No = 76%), and ethics
training experience in hours (M = 1.91, SD = 5.14).
Procedure
Participants were recruited via online human subjects pool (SONA). Participants signed
up and were able to access the online study via a web link that was provided to the participants
upon successful sign-up. The study was hosted on the server provided by Inquisit, which
produced the Millisecond software. This software is useful for administering implicit association
tests as well as measuring the response latencies between stimulus-response presentations of
survey items. This data allows the researcher to adequately test participants to see if they are
providing effortful responses. This helps to ensure higher quality data and to control for
measurement error as a result of effortless responding by participants (i.e., hitting random
buttons). This process will be explained in more detail in the RTE section (see below).
Once participants accessed the online study, they were presented with a cover letter that
functioned much like informed consent. Participants who agreed to participate hit the start
button and began. Participants completed the IAT task first, followed by the DIT. After
completing the DIT, participants rated concept pairings to complete the BECS measure. As soon
as they completed the BECS measure, participants completed the ethical work climate, job
satisfaction, CWB intention, and BIDR items. Following these surveys, participants responded
to demographic questions. Following the completion of the surveys, participants answered an
open-ended question regarding any feedback they wished to provide me regarding the study. I
sorted this feedback into categories and used the information to better implement the full study.
Finally, I assigned each participant an 11-digit, unique code that s/he copied down and sent in an
email to me so that I could verify his/her participation and administer course credit. In order to
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decrease cheating behaviors, I embedded a hidden code within the 11-digit code so that nonparticipants could not use the code to receive credit. Using this method, I detected no cheating.
Finally, participants hit any key, which caused the survey administration system to record their
data and provide them with an online page thanking them for their participation. In all, the study
took between approximately 60 and 75 minutes to complete.
RTE (Response Time Effort)
Cleaning datasets is important for identifying respondents who do not take the task or
study completion seriously. It also is vital for ensuring quality data and increasing the validity of
the tested relationships. Effortless responses in datasets increase the amount of measurement
error and reduce the ability to test for latent variable relationships. Therefore, it is essential to
parse good data from bad.
There are many options for detecting effortless responses, including but not limited to
identifying patterned responses, examining responses to dummy items, and examining response
latencies. Instead of using patterned responses as a means of identifying participants who did not
complete the study in good faith, I used participants’ response latencies to stimulus item
presentations that were provided by the Millisecond software. Patterned responses (e.g.,
responding with all 4s throughout the survey, 1-7-1-7 patterns) may show effortless participation,
but it also requires an inferential leap on the part of researchers. For instance, it is impossible to
determine with confidence that responding “4” to every item reflects true variance (i.e., moderate
attitude) or error variance (e.g., central tendency responding). Therefore, response latencies
reduce the researcher’s inferential leap and provide a more objective metric for distinguishing
between effortless and effortful responding.
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Researchers commonly have used response latencies in the educational assessment
literature (Wise & Kong, 2005). Wise and Kong (2005) created a variable called response time
effort (RTE) for measuring the amount of effort that respondents apply toward completing
surveys. The equations for computing this variable are:
SBij = {1 if RTij ≥ Ti,
0 otherwise}
RTEj = ∑ SBij
---------,
k
where SBij refers to the item solution behavior for each item i and respondent j, RTij refers to
response time for item i and respondent j, Ti refers to the threshold in time for each item i, RTEj
refers to the response time effort for each respondent as defined by the sum of all item solution
behaviors divided by the total number of items, k. Thus, RTE varies as a proportion of items that
are responded to according to the pre-defined threshold and varies from 0 to 1. A score of 1
indicates that respondents surpassed the threshold for every presented item and responded with
enough cognitive effort for every item.
To test for RTE, I set up a threshold for determining how long it should take to respond
to an item. I took into account the time it takes for an item to be presented, read, understood,
processed in relation to the self, decided on in action form, and executed in said action. As a
conservative estimate, I used a threshold of one second. Given the length of the study and its
low-stakes nature to individuals, I posited that the frequency of effortless responses would be
greater than normal. However, I also sought to minimize the number of omitted participants and
to ensure I did not omit large amounts of data compared to similar studies. Therefore, I decided
that one second offered an acceptable, conservative threshold.
122

After deciding on an appropriate threshold, I next decided what proportion of RTE was
appropriate. Unfortunately, the literature has no set guideline or formula for determining what
RTE score is best for maximizing validity and decreasing measurement error. Obviously, the
higher RTE, the more accurate is respondent data. Given the lengthy and low-stakes nature of
this study, it was expected that a greater likelihood of effortless responding would occur. Wise
and Kong (2005) showed that validity is best when RTE ≥ .900. Anything less than .900
decreases validity; specifically, the gains in statistical power from the increased sample size do
not offset losses in validity. For instance, in my study, the partial standardized beta coefficient
between ethical work climate and CWB intentions was -.17 when using all respondents minus
the unemployed and outliers (N = 153) and -.31 when using respondents with RTE scores ≥ .900
(N = 74). The same held true for the relationship between impression management and CWB
intentions (βs = -.34 and -.44, respectively). Thus, despite an increase in statistical power gained
by using the entire sample (doubled sample size), I actually observed a decrease in validity based
on the use of the RTE index. Therefore, I elected to use the most stringent cut-off point for
omitting participants and used RTE ≥ .900.
IAT
Divergent validity. I assessed discriminant validity for the purposes of differentiating
variables that should not be related to the IAT-M. Data for all correlations and validity evidence
can be found in Table 1. The IAT was unrelated to any individual demographic variable (i.e.,
gender, race, education, marital status, religion, industry, work experience, company size, tenure,
ethics training experience), except age (r = .27) and salary (r = .24). The IAT also was unrelated
to social desirability indices (i.e., impression management, self-deception). Also, consistent with
Reynolds’ (2006) neurocognitive model, it could be predicted that the IAT and DIT could be
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Table 1
Correlation Matrix
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

Age

20.76

3.94

x

Gender

-------

-------

0.05

x

Race

-------

-------

-0.07

-0.01

x

Work Exp

3.95

3.4

0.82

0.13

-0.24

x

Tenure

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.71

1.54

0.48

0.18

-0.03

0.60

x

20663.88

73549.74

0.07

-0.01

-0.12

0.06

0.09

x

Religion

-------

-------

0.02

0.12

0.13

-0.03

-0.08

0.06

x

Education

-------

-------

0.58

-0.01

-0.14

0.43

0.36

-0.02

0.07

Marital St

-------

-------

0.23

-0.12

-0.12

0.07

-0.05

0.02

0.05

0.27

x

Industry

-------

-------

-0.11

-0.05

0.24

-0.08

0.06

0.16

0.24

-0.16

0.07

x

Salary

10332.53

9838.11

0.58

-0.06

-0.23

0.68

0.51

0.09

-0.10

0.32

0.16

0.03

x

ET Exp

-------

-------

0.17

-0.01

-0.06

0.11

0.26

0.08

0.02

0.14

0.08

-0.07

0.14

x

ET Hours

3.01

7.06

0.15

0.04

-0.01

0.19

0.33

0.09

0.12

0.17

0.00

-0.07

0.20

0.74

Imp Mgt

7.32

3.98

-0.04

0.18

0.04

0.12

0.13

-0.09

0.09

-0.02

-0.14

0.08

0.09

0.05

Self-Dec

6.92

3.97

0.02

-0.07

0.07

0.07

0.12

-0.08

0.23

0.08

-0.03

0.13

0.05

0.17

IAT-M

0.25

0.33

0.27

-0.08

-0.03

0.15

0.19

0.21

-0.02

0.09

0.07

0.12

0.24

-0.05

Pscore

32.97

11.64

0.07

0.05

-0.24

0.08

-0.07

0.03

-0.07

0.13

0.11

-0.14

0.02

-0.10

Similarity

0.2

0.07

0.22

0.16

-0.15

0.24

0.24

0.04

0.04

0.03

-0.12

-0.03

0.32

0.12

Coherence

0.13

0.23

0.18

0.03

0.01

0.21

0.23

0.03

-0.10

0.26

-0.03

-0.05

0.17

-0.07

EWC

4.9

1.11

-0.20

0.12

0.11

-0.17

-0.22

-0.15

0.06

-0.04

-0.11

0.05

-0.24

-0.04

JSAT

5.06

1.75

-0.18

0.16

-0.03

-0.05

-0.16

-0.12

0.17

-0.17

-0.20

-0.04

-0.23

-0.11

CWBINT

2.45

1.25

0.16

-0.13

-0.13

0.15

0.08

0.00

-0.05

0.00

0.07

0.01

0.18

-0.10

Comp Size

x

Note. N = 75 (Unemployed, outliers, and RTE ≤ .900 omitted). Work Exp. = total amount of work experience
in years. Comp. Size = number of employees in company. Marital St. = Marital Status. ET Exp. = Ethics
Training Experience (i.e., Yes or No). ET Hours = number of hours experience with Ethics Training. Imp.
Mgt. = Impression Management. Self-Dec. = Self-Deception. IAT = Implicit Association Test – Morality.
Pscore = Principled Reasoning Score (Defining Issues Test). EWC = Ethical Work Climate. JSAT = Job
Satisification. CWBINT = Counterproductive Work Behavioral Intentions. Bold p < .01, Bold and Italicized
p < .05, Italicized p < .10. Cronbach’s alphas in parentheses along diagonal. Similarity and Coherence alpha
based on raw BECS ratings. Pscore alpha based on the raw issue ratings per story. Each story alpha was then
averaged for the composite shown in the table.
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Table 1, Continued
Correlation Matrix
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

ET Hours

x

Imp Mgt

0.23

(.84)

Self-Dec

0.30

0.42

(.75)

IAT-M

-0.12

0.04

0.07

(.99)

Pscore

-0.19

-0.15

-0.10

0.09

(.61)

Similarity

0.18

0.09

-0.04

0.11

0.02

Coherence

-0.02

0.06

-0.09

0.01

0.19

0.16

(.93)

EWC

-0.03

0.26

0.18

-0.27

-0.02

-0.07

-0.11

20

21

(.93)

(.91)

JSAT

0.09

0.28

0.21

-0.06

0.06

0.05

-0.08

0.49

(.93)

CWBINT

-0.16

-0.51

-0.20

0.13

0.17

0.05

0.03

-0.43

-0.43

Note. N = 75 (Unemployed, outliers, and RTE ≤ .900 omitted). Work Exp. = total amount of work experience
in years. Comp. Size = number of employees in company. Marital St. = Marital Status. ET Exp. = Ethics
Training Experience (i.e., Yes or No). ET Hours = number of hours experience with Ethics Training. Imp.
Mgt. = Impression Management. Self-Dec. = Self-Deception. IAT = Implicit Association Test – Morality.
Pscore = Principled Reasoning Score (Defining Issues Test). EWC = Ethical Work Climate. JSAT = Job
Satisification. CWBINT = Counterproductive Work Behavioral Intentions. Bold p < .01, Bold and Italicized
p < .05, Italicized p < .10. Cronbach’s alphas in parentheses along diagonal. Similarity and Coherence alpha
based on raw BECS ratings. Pscore alpha based on the raw issue ratings per story. Each story alpha was then
averaged for the composite shown in the table.
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22

(.93)

unrelated because they rely on separate cognitive processes. My results indicated that these
measures of implicit and explicit ethical decision-making were unrelated (r = .088, p = .454).
Convergent validity. It is important assess the validity of a construct as it relates to
similar constructs. It is also important that the related constructs do not correlate too strongly so
as to be unique. I expected that the IAT (Implicit Moral Self-Concept) would be related to the
BECS because the BECS reflects schemas/prototypes of a moral nature, which will likely impact
reflexive judgments. However, Coherence and Similarity from the BECS were unrelated to the
IAT (r’s = .11 and .01, respectively). This may be due to the situational vs. general nature of the
respective measures. In other words, BECS was designed to capture context-specific aspects of
ethical schemas within organizations whereas the IAT was designed to capture more general
aspects of implicit moral self-concepts. This may account for the lack of relationship. In
addition, it is possible that the assessment of concept relatedness is a more conscious process,
which may be unrelated or at best weakly related to a measure of implicit moral reasoning.
Future research can disentangle the answers to these questions.
Criterion-related validity. The purpose of validating the IAT-M is to correlate it with
related outcomes. The IAT and P-scores (DIT) were not correlated with CWB intentions. An
individual’s implicit moral self-concept (i.e., the IAT) would likely impact behaviors more than
intentions. The lack of relationship between P-score and CWB intentions is somewhat
surprising, given the fact that P-score reflects conscious moral reasoning to a greater extent than
the IAT and conscious moral reasoning is reflected also in the criteria. However, the P-score
captures general moral content, so it is not surprising that the P-score did not predict
organizational phenomena, i.e., specific content.
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However, hierarchical regression suggested that the most robust predictors of CWB
intentions within this sample were an individual’s perceptions of ethical work climate and
impression management. Thus, when participant perceived their work climates as operating
more ethically, then those participants were less likely to intend to commit CWBs. Also,
participants were more likely to intend to commit CWBs if they were engaging in impression
management techniques. P-score and IAT both had positive, but non-significant regression
weights.
Antecedents. I did not expect that the EWC would be related to the IAT or DIT, as the
former is business-specific and the latter two are more general indices of moral reasoning at the
implicit and explicit levels. Surprisingly, not only was the IAT correlated with EWC, but the
relationship was negative (r = -.27). This implies that individuals who perceived their work
environments to be more unethical also tended to exhibit a greater implicit preference for moral
views of themselves. It could be that the more individuals view others in their environment
behaving unethically, the more individuals would internalize positive moral beliefs about
themselves. In other words, viewing others as unethical organizational actors may make their
own behavior appear more ethical by comparison. Alternatively, my results might suggest that
participants were engaging in self-serving bias and internalized this bias over time.
EWC (Ethical Work Climate)
I used 20 items from Arnaud’s (2010) measure of ethical climates as well as 6 items from
Victor and Cullen’s (1988) measure. I subjected all 26 ethical work climate items to an
exploratory factor analysis using maximum likelihood estimation with the goal of extracting a
parsimonious, one-factor solution to administer to full study participants. Items are shown in
Table 2. Based on the results of the initial factor analysis and scree plot, the data showed that
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Table 2
Exploratory Factor Analysis – All 26 items for Ethical Work Climate

Item

1

2

1 People around here are aware of ethical issues.

.633

.059

2 People in my department recognize a moral dilemma right away.

.666

.193

3 If a rule or law is broken, people around here are quick to notice.

.691

-.002

.515

.184

.513

.359

.561

.466

.588

.443

.251

.795

.182

.811

.188

.795

.653

.252

.692

.301

.670

.196

4 People in my department sympathize with someone who is having
difficulties in their job.
5 For the most part, when people around here see that someone is
treated unfairly, they feel pity for that person.
6 People around here feel bad for someone who is being taken
advantage of.
7 In my department people feel sorry for someone who is having
problems.
8 People around here are mostly out for themselves.
9 People in my department think of their own welfare first when
faced with a difficult decision.
10 In my department people’s primary concern is their own personal
benefit.
11 People around here have a strong sense of responsibility to society
and humanity.
12 What is best for everyone in the department is the major consideration.
13 The most important concern is the good of all the people in the
department.
14 In my department people are willing to break the rules in order to
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advance in the company.
15 Around here, power is more important than honesty.

.221

.702

.274

.666

.089

.646

.388

-.074

.632

.122

.623

.000

.496

.047

.616

.149

.596

.221

.314

-.443

-.205

-.383

.071

-.109

16 In order to control scarce resources, people in my department are
willing to compromise their ethical values somewhat.
17 People I work with would feel they had to help a peer even if that
person were not a very helpful person.
18 People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility
for a mistake.
19 No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are
always responsible for whatever they do.
20 The most efficient way is always the right way in my organization.
21 People are expected to comply with the law and professional
standards over and above other considerations.
22 People in my organization strictly obey company policies.
23 People are expected to do anything to further the organization’s
interests, regardless of the consequences.
24 There is no room for one’s personal morals or ethics in my
organization.
25 Each person in my organization decides for themselves what is
right and wrong.
26 In my organization, it is expected that you will always do what is
right for your customers and public.
.560
.117
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note. Varimax Rotation

two factors explained the most variance (32% and 10%, respectively). Most of the variance was
explained by the first factor (eigenvalue = 8.351). However, the six items for the second factor
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were all revered-scored items. The first criterion for item deletion was the meaningfulness of the
item groupings. Because the second factor displayed meaningless variance (i.e., participants
were not responding to the content but rather to the structural nature of the items), I elected to
delete these six items. In addition, because Items 23, 24, and 25 were exploratory (i.e., items
from the Victor and Cullen, 1988 measure) and did not load on any factors, I also deleted these
items. Thus, 17 items remained.
The second criterion for item deletion was having factor loadings less than .500. This led
to the deletion of two more items (i.e., Item 17 = .394; Item 20 = .491). Thus, 15 items were left
whose factor loadings exceeded .500 in a one-factor solution. Factor loadings for this single
factor can be seen in Table 3. I computed a Cronbach’s alpha for these items, which resulted in
adequate internal consistency reliability (α = .913).
BECS
Content validity. To develop valid business ethics concept statements, it was important
to triangulate multiple data sources to attain a level of agreement of the most central components
of business ethics knowledge. Therefore, I consulted three sources to gather relevant concept
statements: corporate codes of conduct/mission statements, ethics training and education
materials, and subject matter experts. When assessing concept similarities and designing its
measurement, Mohammed, Klimoski and Rentsch (2000) recommended maximizing the breadth
of content by utilizing multiple sources of information. I will describe all three sources
individually and then describe qualitatively some of the commonalities between all sources.
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Table 3
Exploratory Factor Analysis – Single Factor Ethical Work Climate

Item

Factor Loading

1 People around here are aware of ethical issues.

.591

2 People in my department recognize a moral dilemma right away.

.649

3 If a rule or law is broken, people around here are quick to notice.

.563

4 People in my department sympathize with someone who is having
difficulties in their job.

.560

5 For the most part, when people around here see that someone is
treated unfairly, they feel pity for that person.

.619

6 People around here feel bad for someone who is being taken
advantage of.

.699

7 In my department people feel sorry for someone who is having
problems.

.703

11 People around here have a strong sense of responsibility to society
and humanity.

.706

12 What is best for everyone in the department is the major consideration. .731
13 The most important concern is the good of all the people in the
department.

.656

18 People in my department feel it is better to assume responsibility
for a mistake.

.613

19 No matter how much people around here are provoked, they are
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always responsible for whatever they do.

.559

21 People are expected to comply with the law and professional
standards over and above other considerations.
22 People in my organization strictly obey company policies.

.600
.631

26 In my organization, it is expected that you will always do what is
right for your customers and public.

.504

One, I investigated Fortune 500 companies’ codes of conduct and mission statements for
ethical concept statements. To narrow the search to a select number of companies, I considered
the annual rankings of the most ethical companies in 2011 as compiled by the Ethisphere
Institute. The Ethisphere Institute is a research-based think tank made up of a coalition of
corporations, universities and institutions. Its duty is to provide best practices in business ethics,
corporate social responsibility, anti-corruption and sustainability. From the list of the Ethispere
Institute’s 2011 most ethical companies, I took a random sample of corporations to investigate
and read through the codes of conduct and mission statements from the following companies:
Ford Motor Company, Patagonia, Microsoft, and General Mills. Several common threads
throughout these codes of conduct include the presence and existence of ethics officers/social
responsibility managers and ethics hotlines, code violations leading to disciplinary action, legal
compliance, cultures of honesty and integrity, going above and beyond legal requirements,
company reputation is tied to ethical practices, etc.
Second, I investigated multiple training materials and education textbooks. These were
randomly selected from a library database. Some were meant for academic education in ethical
business practices (Crane & Matten, 2004; Hartman & DesJardins, 2005; Ottensmeyer &
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McCarthy, 1996; Sims, 2002) whereas others were focused on specific industries or professions
(Walter, 2005). For these materials, I focused on the chapter objectives, end-of-chapter
summaries, and bold-faced terms. I focused my attention towards these aspects because I felt
that these would highlight the most important components of ethical knowledge that authors
were wishing their readers/learners to take away from that particular lesson. In addition, I
received some training materials (i.e., books, training programs, DVD vignettes) from my
anonymous subject matter experts (mentioned later) which I reviewed in unison with the
aforementioned materials. I compared my notes on the important topics from the training
materials and compared them with the rest of the data.
Third, I interviewed four subject matter experts in the field of business ethics. Two were
from the private sector, one from the public sector, and one from academia (who also had private
sector experience). All of these subject matter experts had extensive experience and education in
the fields of ethics and compliance. The two private sector employees were directors of ethics
and compliance at their respective companies with decades of experience in their position. Thus,
their positions were at the executive level and have great responsibility. The nature of the
companies varies. For instance, for the private sector companies, one was a large, national
insurance company, and the other was a large, national utilities company. The public sector
expert was a trainer/educator working for a state agency that oversees approximately 600,000
public sector employees. Finally, the academic subject matter expert was a professor in the
business school at a small, private college.
The interviews lasted anywhere between 60-90 minutes in length. The interviews were
very loosely structured, with only a few probing questions that were pre-determined and meant
to stimulate the subject matter expert to free associate on the topic of business ethics. These
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questions were: “Please describe your current occupation and relevant experience and
education,” “Please describe what you believe to be the most important/critical aspects of ethical
knowledge,” and “Please provide examples of ethical situations and what individuals would need
to know to be able to adequately resolve that dilemma.” I took diligent notes as opposed to
audio-recordings due to access to proper equipment.
At the completion of the interviews, I triangulated all notes and materials so as to come
up with approximately 20 concept statements that would sample the content of the business
ethics domain. These statements were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Violating codes of ethics leads to disciplinary action. (Violation)
A culture of honesty and integrity yields a successful organization. (Honesty)
Ethics Officers help foster ethical cultures and policies and are resources for employees. (Officers)
Workplace Codes of Conduct are formal policies that address compliance. (Codes)
There are mechanisms to report unethical conduct. (Mechanisms)
Ethics Lines are useful if you have ethical questions or reports of misconduct. (Hotlines)
Inappropriate/illegal use of company property hurts everybody. (Property)
There is an obligation to report conflicts of interest. (Obligation)
Employees should be compliant with federal and state laws and regulations. (Compliance)
It is important to be accountable to customers, shareholders, partners and employees. (Accountability)
Employees should be aware of and avoid potential conflicts of interest. (Conflicts)
All stakeholders are affected by unethical decisions. (Stakeholders)
Employees should always operate under the “spirit of the law.” (Spirit)
Employees should discuss ethical matters with others. (Others)
It is important to resist external pressures to conform to unethical practices. (Pressures)
Behavior is ethical when it yields the greatest common good for all. (Good)
Objective judgment is important when it comes to ethical decision-making. (Objectivity)
If decisions betray public trust, employees should avoid conducting such behavior. (Public)
Organizational cultures are powerful determinants of ethical actions. (Cultures)

As can be seen, I came up with 19 concept statements that seemed to sum up the majority
opinion regarding the topic. Following this step, I employed the four subject matter experts used
in the interviews to judge the similarities of all paired comparisons of the 19 statements. This
resulted in 171 paired comparisons. These ratings served as the referent expert score when
comparing experts to the study participants. The subject matter experts also reviewed each
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statement individually and rated the quality and essentiality/criticality of each statement. If a
statement received a low quality or essentiality rating, then I dropped that concept statement
from further analysis and did not administer that statement to the pilot or full study participants.
For the subject matter expert survey process, I achieved a 50% response rate. Thus, only
two of the four subject matter experts responded and successfully completed the content
validation survey. I first inspected the quality and essentiality ratings to delete concept
statements that were rated low on these dimensions. Because only two respondents participated
in the survey portion of the study, average ratings would not suffice. Therefore, I implemented
two decision rules for deleting and retaining items. If an item did not satisfy at least one of the
rules, it was deleted. One, in order for a concept statement to be retained, its average rating had
to be at least 5.00 on both dimensions (i.e., quality and criticality). A score of 5.00 on a 7-point
scale corresponded to a rating of “somewhat quality” or “somewhat essential.” A rating of 4.00
was a middle anchor point that corresponded to neither high nor low quality (vice versa, neither
essential nor non-essential). Two, respondents had to agree on the quality and criticality
dimensions (e.g., ratings of 6 and 2 would reflect disagreement). Therefore, if the ratings for a
particular item had a difference greater than 2, the item was deleted. Table 4 shows the average
and agreement ratings and the decision for each concept statement. Low quality/criticality or
disagreement resulted in the deletion of six concept statements. This resulted in 13 concept
statements retained for the pilot study. Thirteen concept statements when paired together
resulted in 78 paired comparisons for the pilot study.
Construct validity. The average similarity and coherence index for the pilot study was
M = .202 (SD = .070) and M = .129 (SD = .234), respectively. Thus, the average level of
coherent knowledge structures was quite low, but this was to be expected given the low average
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age (M = 20.76 years, SD = 3.94) and limited work experience (M = 3.95 years, SD = 3.40) of
the sample. In addition, these scores were consistent with other studies using similar parameters
and similar individuals in different content domains (Lau & Yuen, 2009; Trumpower & Sarwar,
2010). Also, the low coherence and similarity scores could be due to a lack of effort or a lack of
task understanding. The former is not likely given our RTE inclusion criteria. The latter is
somewhat more likely for two reasons. One, participants were not given a practice task to
familiarize participants with the paired comparison task. This may have led to confusion about
the task. Second, the concept statements may have been too long and complex, making paired
comparisons difficult. PathFinder developer Roger Schvaneveldt suggested that the particular
statements I presented to participants were complex and multidimensional, especially compared
to past studies using the Pathfinder procedure. He recommended shortening statements to two or
three word phrases so individuals can make comparisons properly (personal communication, Feb
2, 2012). Therefore, for the full study, I elected to not only add a practice task before the main
paired comparison task but also shorten the concepts from full sentences to short phrases to
decrease the cognitive load required by the item comparisons. In addition, because of the
redundant nature of paired comparison ratings and the noticeable decline in response latencies
over time for these ratings, I shortened the number of concepts from 13 to 11. This should
increase participant motivation to respond and decrease fatigue. The consensus of a small group
of I/O psychologists was that the two items I dropped either were not face valid or were unclear.
These items were “Resisting Unethical Conformity” and “Objective Judgment in Ethics.” The
11 concepts retained for the full study were:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Culture of Integrity
Codes of Conduct
Company Property
Laws and Regulations
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Accountability to Stakeholders
Conflicts of Interest
Unintended Consequences
“Spirit of the Law”
Ethical Discussions with Others
Public Trust
Strong Organizational Cultures

Another noteworthy observation that resulted from validating the BECS measure was the
poor knowledge structures of our SMEs. Both SMEs had coherence scores of less than .20. This
also might be an indication that the task was difficult to understand for either of the reasons
mentioned above (e.g., task understanding). For the pilot study, I elected to use only one of the
two SMEs as the referent expert. I decided that one of the SME’s structures was suspect
(his/her’s concept ratings suggested little discrimination between the concepts). Possibly this
SME had insufficient experience within the fields of ethics and compliance. The other SME had
greater amounts of experience in ethics and compliance and his/her structure reflected greater
discrimination between concepts. For the purposes of the pilot study, I used the latter SME,
despite the shortcomings of using one referent (i.e., reliability concerns) and the low coherence
for this particular SME. For the full study, greater care was taken to selecting additional SMEs
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Table 4
SME Ratings of Ethics Concepts

Concept Statements

Agree Gap
Crit

Agree Gap
Qual

Rating
Avg Crit

Rating
Avg Qual

Gap Retain/Delete
Criteria

Avg.
Retain/Delete
Criteria

Overall
Retain/Delete
Criteria

Violating codes of ethics leads to disciplinary action.

3

4

4.50

4.00

Delete

Delete

Delete

A culture of honesty and integrity yields a successful
organization.

1

0

6.50

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

Ethics Officers help foster ethical cultures and policies and
are resources for employees.

3

3

5.50

5.50

Delete

Retain

Delete

Workplace Codes of Conduct are formal policies that address
compliance.

2

1

5.00

5.50

Retain

Retain

Retain

There are mechanisms to report unethical conduct.

4

3

5.00

4.50

Delete

Delete

Delete

Ethics Lines are useful if you have ethical questions or
reports of misconduct.

3

3

5.50

4.50

Delete

Delete

Delete

Inappropriate/illegal use of company property hurts
everybody.

1

1

6.50

6.50

Retain

Retain

Retain

There is an obligation to report conflicts of interest.

4

3

4.00

3.50

Delete

Delete

Delete

Employees should be compliant with federal and state laws
and regulations.

0

0

7.00

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

It is important to be accountable to customers, shareholders,
partners and employees.

0

1

7.00

6.50

Retain

Retain

Retain

Employees should be aware of and avoid potential conflicts
of interest.

0

0

7.00

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

All stakeholders are affected by unethical decisions.

0

0

7.00

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain
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Employees should always operate under the “spirit of the
law.”

1

1

6.50

6.50

Retain

Retain

Retain

Employees should discuss ethical matters with others.

0

1

6.00

6.50

Retain

Retain

Retain

It is important to resist external pressures to conform to
unethical practices.

0

0

7.00

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

Behavior is ethical when it yields the greatest common good
for all.

3

4

2.50

3.00

Delete

Delete

Delete

Objective judgment is important when it comes to ethical
decision-making.

0

2

6.00

6.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

If decisions betray public trust, employees should avoid
conducting such behavior.

0

0

7.00

7.00

Retain

Retain

Retain

Organizational cultures are powerful determinants of ethical
actions.

1

2

6.50

6.00

Retain

Retain

Retain
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with adequate experience and providing task instructions that were easier to understand.
Convergent validity. Regardless, coherence in pilot study participants’ responses was
significantly correlated with number of years with current employer (r = .23, p = .048) and
education (r = .26, p = .024) and marginally correlated with total work experience in years (r =
.21, p = .07). Similarity was significantly correlated with number of years with current employer
(r = .24, p = .04), total work experience in years (r = .24, p = .04), salary (r = .32, p = .01) and
marginally correlated with age (r = .22, p = .06). However, coherence and similarity were
unrelated to either IAT-M or P-score, variables I expected to be related. However, it is
impossible to discount the differences in the nature of the variables (i.e., BECS is contextspecific whereas the IAT-M and P-score are general). In addition, the BECS, IAT-M, and Pscore may reflect different components of the ethical decision-making process. Nevertheless, I
concluded from this evidence that the more experience individuals have in work settings, the
more coherent an individual’s knowledge structure is and the more similar their structure is to a
referent expert. This is important convergent validity evidence to consider in the development of
the BECS.
Divergent validity. There were two important pieces of discriminant validity evidence.
One, both coherence and similarity indexes were unrelated to demographic variables such as
race, gender, and religion. Age was significantly correlated with similarity but this is likely due
to the fact that older individuals also tend to have more work experience. Two, both indexes
were unrelated to impression management and self deception scales. Thus, results provided
preliminary evidence that the BECS, as expected, was not susceptible to socially desirable
responding. In addition, the BECS was unrelated to company size and industry, which also has
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benefits for the practical applications of this measure (i.e., no bias for larger corporations or
particular industries).
Criterion-related validity. BECS indexes were unrelated to CWB intentions and job
satisfaction. The full study may reveal significant relationships because the full study included
behavioral criteria as well as reflected the improved BECS implementation and items.
Antecedents. Unexpectedly, ethical work climate was unrelated to either of the two
BECS indexes (coherence and similarity). I expected that the BECS would be susceptible to
contextual influences and that there would be inter-relatedness between these constructs. I may
observe different results in the full reflecting a sample with greater work experience or
improvements in the BECS measure.
Hypotheses
To test for some of the hypotheses and the research question, I conducted hierarchical
regression analyses. Data can be found in Table 5. I predicted that the BECS would explain
unique variance in CWBs controlling for the DIT (Hypothesis 1). This relationship was not
found, as neither the BECS nor the DIT predicted CWB intentions. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not
supported. I did not collect data to test Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, relating to CWBI and
CWBO in the pilot study. I was able to test my prediction that ethical work climates would
moderate the individual moral reasoning-CWB relationship (Hypothesis 4). Initial tests
suggested that ethical work climates did not moderate the individual moral reasoning-CWB
relationships for any of the individual variables. This could be due to low statistical power for
detecting interactive effects (N = 75) or the fact that I only measured intentions in the pilot study
and not behaviors. Research Question 1 addressed whether ethical work climates would predict
CWBs above and beyond the individual moral reasoning variables (i.e., BECS, DIT, and IAT141

M). The hierarchical regression model suggested that this was the case. In fact, an ethical work
climate was the only significant predictor of CWB intentions other than impression management.
This pilot study result suggested that an individual’s perception of their work climate is the
single best predictor of the intention to commit CWBs. Ethical work climates predicted 7.7% of
the variance in CWB intentions above and beyond that explained by the individual moral
reasoning variables as well as impression management.
Table 5
Individual Variable Effects on CWB Intentions

Model

Δ R2

t

p

Impression MGT

-.51

-4.47

.000

Self-Deception

.02

0.17

.867

Impression MGT

-.51

-4.51

.000

Self-Deception

.01

0.08

.935

IAT

.15

1.49

.140

Impression MGT

-.50

-4.43

.000

Self-Deception

.01

0.12

.907

IAT

.14

1.40

.165

Pscore

.09

0.82

.415

1

.248

2

.272

3

4

R2

β

Variables

.279

.288

.023

.007

.010
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Impression MGT

-.51

-4.41

.000

Self-Deception

.03

0.24

.812

IAT

.14

1.32

.190

Pscore

.07

0.69

.494

Similarity

.08

0.73

.468

Coherence

.06

0.52

.063

Impression MGT

-.44

-3.97

.000

Self-Deception

.06

0.51

.612

IAT

.05

0.46

.650

Pscore

.10

0.97

.338

Similarity

.06

0.61

.543

Coherence

.01

0.13

.901

EWC

-.31

-2.82

.006

5

.365

.077

N = 75
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Appendix B
The Defining Issues Test
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Appendix C
Business Ethics Cognitive Structure (BECS)
You are about to begin a paired comparison similarity task. Below are ten statements regarding
business ethics. A pair of statements will be randomly assigned and you will need to rate the
relatedness between the two statements. You will respond according to a scale of 1-7, 1 meaning
the statements are “very unrelated” from each other and 7 meaning the statements are “very
related.”
_________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very
Very
Unrelated
Related
1. Culture of Integrity
2. Codes of Conduct
3. Company Property
4. Laws and Regulations
5. Accountability to Stakeholders
6. Conflicts of Interest
7. Unintended Consequences
8. “Spirit of the Law”
9. Ethical Discussions with Others
10. Public Trust
11. Strong Organizational Cultures
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Appendix D
Implicit Association Test-Morality (Single Target)
IAT Test Items
Moral: Altruist, Sincere, Honest, Giving, Helping
Immoral: Deceptive, Arrogant, Cheating, Lying, Stealing
Me: I, Me, My, Mine, Self
Task Process: Participants place their left index or middle finger on the ‘e’ key and the right
index or middle finger on the ‘i’ key. Participants will perform 5 blocks. Each block will
contain 20 trials. For block 1, participants match moral/immoral (i.e., left and right,
respectively) words into the correct category. For block 2, the moral category is matched with
the “me” category on the left and participants are instructed to match words to the correct
category. Block 3 is a repeat of Block 2. For blocks 4 and 5, the “me” category is matched with
the immoral category and participants are required to match the words with the appropriate
categories.
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Appendix E
Ethical Work Climate
Please respond to the following items as it pertains to your work environment on a scale of 1-7, 1
meaning you “strongly disagree” with the statement and 7 meaning you strongly “agree” with the
statement.
_________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
disagree
agree
1. People in my organization are aware of ethical issues.
2. People in my organization recognize a moral dilemma right away.
3. If a rule or law is broken, people in my organization are quick to notice.
4. People in my organization sympathize with someone who is having difficulties in their job.
5. For the most part, when people in my organization see that someone is treated unfairly, they
feel pity for that person.
6. People in my organization feel bad for someone who is being taken advantage of.
7. In my organization, people feel sorry for someone who is having problems.
8. People in my organization have a strong sense of responsibility to society and humanity.
9. What is best for everyone in the organization is the major consideration.
10. The most important concern is the good of all the people in the organization.
11. People in my organization feel it is better to assume responsibility for a mistake.
12. No matter how much people in my organization are provoked, they are always responsible
for whatever they do.
13. People are expected to comply with the law and professional standards over and above other
considerations.
14. People in my organization strictly obey company policies.
15. In my organization, it is expected that you will always do what is right for your customers
and public.
Scoring Procedures: Items are summed and then averaged by the number of items. Higher
scores would signify higher perceived levels of ethical work climates.
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Appendix F
Counterproductive Work Behaviors
Please respond to the following items as it pertains to your work environment on a scale of 1-7, 1 meaning you “strongly disagree” with the
statement and 7 meaning you strongly “agree” with the statement.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Never
Daily
Behaviors
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Made fun of someone at work (I)
Taken property from work without permission (O)
Said something hurtful to someone at work (I)
Spent too much time daydreaming or fantasizing instead of working (O)
Made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark at work (I)
Taken an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace (O)
Cursed at someone at work (I)
Falsified a receipt at work to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on expenses (O)
Played a mean prank on someone at work (I)
Come in late to work without permission (O)
Acted rudely toward someone at work (I)
Littered your work environment (O)
Publicly embarrassed someone at work (I)
Neglected to follow your boss’ instructions (O)
Intentionally worked slower than you could have worked (O)
Discussed confidential company information with an unauthorized person (O)
Used an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job (O)
Put little effort into your work (O)
Dragged out work in order to get overtime (O)

Intentions
Please respond to the following items as it pertains to your work environment on a scale of 1-7, 1 meaning you “strongly disagree” with the
statement and 7 meaning you strongly “agree” with the statement.
1
No matter what the circumstances,
I would not engage in the behavior
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

7
In a wide variety of circumstances,
I would engage in the behavior.

Take office supplies from the company.
Give away goods or services for free.
Discuss confidential matters with unauthorized personnel within or outside the organization.
Lie to employer or supervisor to cover up a mistake.
Conduct personal business during work time.
Spend time on the internet for reasons not related to work.
Take a long lunch or coffee break without approval.
Waste time on the job.
Use company resources you aren’t authorized to use.
Make personal long distance calls at work.
Mail personal packages at work.
Make personal photocopies at work.
Use email for personal purposes.
Play computer games during work time.
Work unnecessary overtime.
Fail to read the manual outlining safety procedures.
Use sick leave when not really sick.
Leave work early without permission.
Argue or fight with a co-worker.
Argue or fight with a supervisor.

Scoring Procedures: Sum responses according to each factor. Average them across number of items per factor for original metric calculation.
Higher scores signify higher propensities of engaging in the behavior. I = Interpersonal, O = Organizational.
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Appendix G
Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire – Job Satisfaction Subscale
Please respond to the following items on a scale of 1-7, 1 meaning you “strongly disagree” with
the statement and 7 meaning you strongly “agree” with the statement.
_________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
disagree
agree
1. All in all, I am satisfied with my job.
2. In general, I don’t like my job. (R)
3. In general, I like working in my job.
Scoring Procedures: “(R)” signifies a reverse-scored item. Reverse-scored items are re-coded,
all items are summed and averaged. Higher scores signify greater job satisfaction.
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Appendix H
IPIP Scales of Big 5 Personality Traits
Please respond to the following items on a scale of 1-5, 1 meaning you the description is very
inaccurate in describing you and 5 meaning the item very accurately describes you.
_________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
Very
Very
Inaccurate
Accurate
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Have a good word for everyone. (a+)
Waste my time. (c-)
Feel comfortable around people. (e+)
Rarely get irritated. (n-)
Believe in the importance of art. (o+)
Have a sharp tongue. (a-)
Am always prepared. (c+)
Have little to say. (e-)
Often feel blue. (n+)
Am not interested in abstract ideas. (o-)
Believe that others have good intentions. (a+)
Find it difficult to get down to work. (c-)
Make friends easily. (e+)
Seldom feel blue. (n-)
Have a vivid imagination. (o+)
Cut others to pieces. (a-)
Pay attention to details. (c+)
Keep in the background. (e-)
Dislike myself. (n+)
Do not like art. (o-)
Respect others. (a+)
Do just enough work to get by. (c-)
Am skilled in handling social situations. (e+)
Feel comfortable with myself. (n-)
Tend to vote for liberal political candidates. (o+)
Suspect hidden motives in others. (a-)
Get chores done right away. (c+)
Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. (e-)
Am often down in the dumps. (n+)
Avoid philosophical discussions. (o-)
Accept people as they are. (a+)
Don't see things through. (c-)
Am the life of the party. (e+)
Am not easily bothered by things. (n-)
Carry the conversation to a higher level. (o+)
Get back at others. (a-)
Carry out my plans. (c+)
Don't like to draw attention to myself. (e-)
Have frequent mood swings. (n+)
Do not enjoy going to art museums. (o-)
Make people feel at ease. (a+)
Shirk my duties. (c-)
Know how to captivate people. (e+)
Am very pleased with myself. (n-)
Enjoy hearing new ideas. (o+)
Insult people. (a-)
Make plans and stick to them. (c+)
Don't talk a lot. (e-)
Panic easily. (n+)
Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. (o-)

Scoring Procedures: Each Big 5 trait has 10 items and is coded according to the first letter in parentheses in the above items. The +/- next to the letter
corresponds to whether the item is reverse-scored (- = reverse-scored). Sum all item responses per trait to obtain a total score. Higher scores signify higher
levels of that trait.
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Appendix I
Demographics
Please provide the best possible answer that corresponds to you.
1.

What is your age?

2.

What is your gender?
1 Male

3.

2 Female

What is your race?
1 White/Caucasian
4 Hispanic

4.

2 Black/African-American
5 Native American

3 Asian/Pacific
6 Other

What is the highest level of education you have completed?
1 Less than High School
2 High School/GED 3 Some College
4 2-year College Degree (Associates)
5 4-year College Degree (BA/BS)
6 Master’s Degree
7 Doctoral Degree
8 Professional Degree (MD, JD)

5.

To the best of your knowledge, what was your ACT test score (range: 1-36)?

6.

To the best of your knowledge, what was your SAT test score (range: 400-1600, pre-2005 or 600-2400, post-2005)?

7.

Is English your first language?

8.

What is your current marital status?
1 Single, Never married

9.

2 Married 3 Separated

4 Divorced5 Widowed

What is your current religious affiliation?
1 Protestant Christian 2 Roman Catholic
5 Muslim
6 Hindu

3 Evangelical Christian
7 Buddhist

4 Jewish
8 Other

10. How much total work experience do you have, in months?
11. Are you currently employed?
1 Yes

2 No

12. Are you employed full- or part-time?
1 Full

2 Part

3 Unemployed

13. How long, in months, have you been working for your current employer?
14. Approximately how large is your company in terms of number of employees?
15. What industry sector best describes your company?
1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
2 Mining
3 Construction
5 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
7 Retail Trade
8 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
10 Public Administration
11 Other
12 Stay-at-home

4 Manufacturing
6 Wholesale Trade
9 Services
13 Unemployed

16. Approximately how much is your annual salary?
17. Have you ever attended an ethics training/ethics education seminar?
1 Yes

2 No

18. Approximately how many total hours have you attended ethics training/ethics education seminars?
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Appendix J
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)
Please respond to the following items on a scale of 1-7, 1 meaning you “not true” with the
statement and 7 meaning you strongly “very true” with the statement.
_________________________________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Not True
Very True
Impression Management Subscale
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
2. I never cover up my mistakes.
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of people.
4. I never swear.
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
6. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
10. I always declare everything at customs.
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
12. I have never dropped litter on the street.
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
14. I never read sexy books or magazines.
15. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
19. I have some pretty awful habits.
20. I don’t gossip about other’s people’s business.
Self-Deception Subscale
21. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
22. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
23. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me.
24. I have not always been honest with myself.
25. I always know why I like things.
26. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
27. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
28. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
29. I am fully in control of my own fate.
30. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
31. I never regret my decisions.
32. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough.
33. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
34. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
35. I am a completely rational person.
36. I rarely appreciate criticism.
37. I am very confident of my judgments.
38. I have sometimes doubted my intelligence.
39. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
40. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
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Appendix K
COVER LETTER
Department of Psychology
Wright State University
Dayton, OH 45435

The purpose of this research study is to examine individual responses to various measures
of morality and ethics as they relate to business contexts. You are invited to complete several
online questionnaires. These questionnaires should take no more than one and a half hours to
complete. There is minimal risk and discomfort anticipated as part of or as a result of this
research study. The primary risk is fatigue resulting from responding to the questionnaires. Any
information about you obtained from this study will be kept strictly confidential and you will not
be identified in any report or publication. Clicking the “I Agree” button below and continuing
with the questionnaires implies your consent to participate. In exchange for participation, you
will be entered into a drawing for a chance to win a $20 gift card from Amazon.com. You are
free to refuse to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time. Your decision to participate
or to not participate will not adversely affect your standing at this institution or cause a loss of
benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. There is no penalty of any kind for either
non-participation or withdrawal at any time. A summary of the results of this study may be
requested by contacting the researchers listed below by June 2012. The summary will show only
aggregate (combined) data. No individual results will be available. If you have questions or
concerns about this research study, you can contact the researcher Zach Kalinoski at
kalinoski.2@wright.edu, or the faculty advisor, Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson, at debra.steelejohnson@wright.edu. If you have general questions about giving consent or your rights as a
research participant in this research study, you can call the Wright State University
Institutional Review Board at 937-775-4462.

___________________________________________
Zach Kalinoski, Primary Investigator
___________________________________________
Debra Steele-Johnson, Faculty Advisor
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